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ABSTRACT 
The present thesis examines the determinants of the bankruptcy protection 
duration for Canadian firms. Using a sample of Canadian firms that filed for 
bankruptcy protection between the calendar years 1992 and 2009, we fmd that the 
firm age, the industry adjusted operating margin, the default spread, the industrial 
production growth rate or the interest rate are influential factors on determining the 
length of the protection period. Older firms tend to stay longer under protection from 
creditors. As older firms have more complicated structures and issues to settle, the 
risk of exiting soon the protection (the hazard rate) is small. We also find that firms 
that perform better than their benchmark as measured by the industry they belong to, 
tend to leave quickly the bankruptcy protection state. We conclude that the fate of 
relatively successful companies is determined faster. Moreover, we report that it takes 
less time to achieve a final solution to firms under bankrupt~y when the default spread 
is low or when the appetite for risk is high. Conversely, during periods of high default 
spreads and flight for quality, it takes longer time to resolve the bankruptcy issue. This 
last finding may suggest that troubled firms should place themselves under protection 
when spreads are low. However, this ignores the endogeneity issue: high default 
spread may cause and incidentally reflect higher bankruptcy rates in the economy. 
Indeed, we find that bankruptcy protection is longer during economic downturns. We 
explain this relation by the natural increase in default rate among firms (and 
individuals) during economically troubled times. Default spreads are usually larger 
during these harsh periods as investors become more risk averse since their wealth 
shrinks. 
Using a Log-logistic hazard model, we also fmd that firms that file under the 
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) protection spend longer time 
restructuring than firms that filed under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). As 
BIA is more statutory and less flexible, solutions can be reached faster by court 
orders. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy costs are incurred when insolvent debtors file for bankruptcy 
protection. Both direct and indirect bankruptcy costs are affected by the debt 
restructuring process. Direct costs are those associated with the bankruptcy protection 
process including legal and administrative fees. Indirect costs include lost managerial 
opportunities (Altman (1984)), forgone revenues and profits, increased operating 
costs, l and reduced competitiveness. Though few studies empirically assess indirect 
costs, it is believed that they are substantial (Warner (1977); Fisher and Martel 
(2001)). Altman (1984) examines both direct and indirect bankruptcy costs. He finds 
that the bankruptcy costs are not marginal. Betker (1995) supports that fmding. He 
finds that most firms paid trade creditors in full in order to avoid negotiating with a 
diverse creditor group. Franks and Torous (1989) and Weiss (1990) list substantial 
violations of the absolute priority of claims. They also support the economic 
significance of the indirect bankruptcy costs. 
Obviously, reducing bankruptcy costs is a universal and important objective to 
most stakeholders involved in the bankruptcy process.2 Economically, one should 
consider the total value destruction or salvation to judge on the effectiveness of 
bankruptcy protection process. Bankruptcy protection duration is essential because 
longer protection is associated with higher bankruptcy costs. 
The financial literature examined the determinants of the bankruptcy protection 
duration (see Bandopadhyaya 1994; Li 1999; Partington et al. 2001; Partington et al. 
2007; Orbe et al. 2002; Helwege 1999; Denis and Rodgers 2007; Fisher and Martel 
2007). Major fmdings are that, besides the firm's specific attributes, relevant 
industrial sector, common market variables and bargain issues are also significant 
1 This costs refer to the lost of key employees or having to pay more to keep them in the firm. 
2 One can argue that some parties, i.e. lawyers maybe interested in longer process as their fees are 
positively associated with the duration. We refer here mainly to the various debtholders and the 
incumbent management. 
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determinants for the duration of bankruptcy protection. Prior research suffers two 
main limitations. First, some factors of interest were not investigated. Second, all 
empirical investigations focused on U.S. data. 
The objective of this thesis is to identify the potential factors in explaining the 
variation in the duration of bankruptcy protection for firms with different bankruptcy 
protection outcomes. Using different theoretical hazard models, we investigate the 
effects of various variables on the duration of firms that fIled under bankruptcy 
protection in Canada. Our empirical investigation is based on a sample of firms that 
fIled under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA henceforth) or Companies' 
Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA henceforth) protection between 1992 and 2009. 
The contributions of our study are three folds: 1) Unlike the vast literature that 
focuses on the U.S. insolvent firms, our study analyzes the problems in the context of 
Canadian public firms. 2) We extend the existing studies by initiating a dummy 
variable that differentiates between two distinct Canadian bankruptcy protection 
procedures. 3) The effects of the listing venues and trustee/monitor information are 
also captured. In bankruptcy study topics, the scarce of data resources and information 
limits the analysis of Canadian firms. The duration models enable us to use 128 public 
firms with complete information and 16 firms that are still under protection at the end 
of research period. We believe that the present study can offer a comparison to the 
Chapter 11 research. 
We fmd that fmn's industry adjusted operating margin, age, and default spread, 
industrial production growth or interest rate are significant factors in explaining 
bankruptcy protection duration across all three distinct hazard models. The better their 
pre-fIling industry adjusted operating performance, the less time fmns spend in 
bankruptcy protection. A wider default spread significantly increases the fmn's 
protection duration time. Firms that fIle for bankruptcy protection during economic 
downturns need longer protection period. Firms which lived longer before the fIling 
need more time to discharge from bankruptcy protection. We also fmd that fIrms that 
fIle under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) spend longer duration in 
protection with Log-logistic hazard modeL The secured debt ratio plays a role in 
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affecting the duration of time in that firms with higher secured debt ratio spend less 
time in bankruptcy protection, but this effect is insignificant. The bankrupt firms with 
big trustees/monitors do not spend shorter period in bankruptcy protection. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter, we 
discuss the topics that have been talked about around the bankruptcy area. In chapter 
III, we briefly describe the legal process of Chapter 11 and the two Canadian 
bankruptcy protection procedures. We also compare the Chapter 11 and Canadian 
Bankruptcy Code, and differentiate between the two Canadian bankruptcy protection 
Codes. We detail the parametric hazard models and the Cox's proportional hazard 
model in chapter IV, where we also introduce the independent variables for estimation. 
The sample selection process is discussed in chapter V. The estimation results and 
analysis are presented in chapter VI. Chapter VII concludes the thesis and provides 
further discussion. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Bankruptcy protection procedure is complex. It involves various parties with 
different and sometimes contradicting interests. There are ample both theoretical and 
empirical studies on the topic of bankruptcy. In the present thesis, we focus on the 
bankruptcy duration analysis. Furthermore, while briefly describe the literature on 
bankruptcy prediction and post-bankruptcy performance. 
2.1. Bankruptcy Prediction 
Early literature on bankruptcy prediction mainly adopted statistical methods using 
accounting explanatory variables. Altman (1968) applies various predictive ratios into 
a multivariate setting and forms a specific model that is used to predict bankruptcy 
with a comparatively high accuracy. He argues that earlier studies chose univariate 
ratio to predict bankruptcy, causing the results to be subject to misinterpretation. The 
multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) not only works well with the original sample, 
but also has an accurate predictability in several secondary samples. Instead of 
adopting the MDA, Ohlson (1980) uses conditional logit analysis which avoids 
certain shortcomings of MDA mode1.3 Using the logit analysis method with nine 
independent variables (all accounting variables), Ohlson provides a newer model for 
predicting bankruptcy. 
Shumway (2001) argues that the early studies were almost always conducted 
with static models (Altman (1968); Ohlson (1980)). By choosing one specific year of 
accounting data and applying the static model, a selection bias is introduced into the 
estimation results. A simple hazard model can produce consistent and unbiased results 
because it utilizes all available information in determining the firm's risk of 
3 The MDA model requires that the variance and covariance matrix of the predictors to be the same for 
both the bankrupt and the non-bankrupt firm sample and the independent variables be normally 
distributed. 
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bankruptcy. By using hazard based model, only half of the variables from Altman 
(1968) are significantly related to the failure. According to Shumway's research, 
adding market wide variables produces more accurate out of sample forecasts. 
Recent bankruptcy prediction analysis is not limited to the statistical approach. 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) use an option pricing model to compute monthly default 
likelihood indicators. They show that the size and the book-to-market effects relate to 
the default risk, and that the default risk is systematic. Hillegeist et at. (2004) compare 
the statistical models (Altman's Z- and Ohlson's O-scores) with the implied default 
probability from the Black-Scholes-Merton model. They conclude that the latter 
model provides more information than the statistical models. The artificial neutral 
networks method is also used by many researchers in bankruptcy prediction, e.g., 
Zhang et al. (1999) and Calderon and Cheh (2002). Ravi Kumar and Ravi (2007) 
provide a survey of the various papers using different methods for bankruptcy 
prediction. 
2.2. Bankruptcy Duration Analysis 
Few papers study the duration of the bankruptcy protection process. Franks and 
Torous (1989) document that the process can be lengthy. Franks and Torous (1994) 
compare the durations between distressed exchanges and Chapter 11 reorganizations 
and fmd that the informal reorganizations require significantly less time to restructure 
as firms try first to informally negotiate a settlement before entering the formal 
Chapter 11 process. The median duration value for the distressed exchanges is 17 
months, while the median duration value for the Chapter 11 reorganizations is 27 
months. Weiss (1990) reports that the average firm spends 2.5 years under bankruptcy 
protection; which is significantly lower than the mean duration of 12.5 years reported 
by Warner (1977) for a sample of 11 railroad companies. 
The main purpose of the former papers was not to measure the duration of the 
bankruptcy protection per se but rather that was a secondary issue. Bandopadhyaya 
(1994) specifically examines the duration of bankruptcy protection using a hazard rate 
model that follows a Weibull distribution. Based on a sample of 74 firms covering the 
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period 1979-1990, he fmds that higher interest outstanding and capacity utilization 
reduce the duration of the bankruptcy protection. Bandopadhyaya documents positive 
duration dependence for the hazard rate, which indicates that ftnns that stay longer 
under protection are more likely to emerge or exit from the protection. 
Partington et al. (2001) use Cox's proportional hazard model to predict whether 
stockholders lose all their claims or receive some value when a ftnn emerges from 
Chapter 11 protection. Both the protection duration and the value to the stockholders 
upon emergence from Chapter 11 are examined. The authors use a forward stepwise 
estimation procedure to create a parsimonious model based on ftnn specific and 
market wide variables. The covariates are applied to two different models. The ftrst 
model contains only firm specific covariates, while the second adds the market wide 
covariates. The authors find that all market wide covariates are significant. For the 
firm speciftc covariates the ratio of earnings before interests taxes and depreciation to 
total assets, the natural log of market value of equity, and the current ratio are 
signiftcant. The authors use the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves to 
assess the predictive accuracy, and ftnd that the two models are similar in terms of 
predictive performance. 
Similar to Bandopadhyaya (1994), Li (1999) examines the instantaneous 
probability of a firm's emergence from Chapter 11. Using a Log-logistic hazard model, 
the author ftnds that ftrms which spend more time in pre-packaged Chapter 11 and 
pre-Chapter 11 negotiation spend less time in Chapter 11 protection. Higher gross 
proftt margin quickens the restructuring process, while the existence of legal disputes 
and larger ftrm size slow down the emergence process. Finally, the ftrms which ftled 
in 1990s spent less time in Chapter 11 protection, implying that the courts and 
bankruptcy professionals were more experienced during that period of time. The 
inverted U-shaped hazard suggests that it is reasonable given the institutional features 
of Chapter 11. 
Orbe et al. (2002) attempt to determine the factors that affect the length of time 
spend in Chapter 11 protection using a censored partial regression model. This study 
is similar to Li (1999) as the authors apply comparable covariates and employ the 
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same data set. The results show that fIrms that fIle for pre-packaged bankruptcy need 
less time to exit from Chapter 11, while fIrms with higher profItability emerge from 
Chapter 11 faster. The time of negotiation before Chapter 11, the size of the fIrm, the 
engagement of highly leveraged transactions, and the disputes covariates are also 
related to the duration spent under Chapter 11. 
Helwege (1999) analyzes junk bond defaults to determine which variables affect 
the duration of time spent in distress. The fmdings suggest that fIrms with 
proportionally more bonds resolve their defaults faster. Bank debt leads to longer 
resolution times. The fIndings also show that the variation in the bankruptcy 
protection duration is related to bargaining issues. Larger fIrms with more contingent 
liabilities and lawsuits will have slower restructuring processes. Contrary to fmdings 
by Jensen (1991) and Wruck (1990), Helwege (1999) reports that highly leveraged 
transactions do not explain variations in bankruptcy duration. There is little evidence 
that fIrms restructure faster in order to preserve value. Information asymmetry 
between managers and creditors or between different creditor classes does not 
signifIcantly affect the bankruptcy protection duration. 
Partington et al. (2007) use a larger sample than their early 2001 work. They use 
Grambsch and Therneau's (1994) test and Allison's (1984) sensitivity analysis to 
assess the proportional hazard assumption and the independent censoring assumption. 
The fmdings suggest that the former model is unstable and sensitive to data selection 
as current ratio, term spread, and earnings before interests taxes depreciation and 
amortization to total assets become insignifIcant when new observations are added to 
the sample. Partington et at. (2007) confIrm the proportional hazard assumption. 
However, they provide evidence against the independence censoring assumption as 
the term spread is sensitive to the censoring times. 
Denis and Rodgers (2007) analyze the factors that affect the duration using 
Weibull hazard model. They fInd that the industry adjusted operating margin, the 
industry median operating margin, the fIrm size, and the interaction between weak 
industry and adjusted fIrm operating margin are signifIcant determinants of the time 
spend under Chapter 11 protection. However, only the fInn size signifIcantly increases 
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the duration for ultimately acquired firms. Conversely, for the firms that chose to 
reorganize, the industry median operating margin and the interaction term between 
weak industry and adjusted firm operating margin are significant determinants. 
To our knowledge, Fisher and Martel (2007) is the only paper that discusses the 
bankruptcy protection duration for Canadian firms. The main purpose of Fisher and 
Martel is to examine the impact of the 1992 change in legislation from the Bankruptcy 
Act (BA) into the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) which is described as more 
"debtor-friendly like Chapter-11". Fisher and Martel (2007) fmd that higher cash 
payments to creditors lead to significantly lower bankruptcy duration. They also fmd 
that after the legislative change, bankruptcy duration increased post BIA adoption. 
2.3. Post-Bankruptcy Performance 
Hotchkiss (1995) examines the effects of CEO turnover on the post-bankruptcy 
performance in order to test whether Chapter 11 is biased toward reorganization over 
liquidation. The author uses three approaches to assess the sample firms' 
post-bankruptcy performance: (i) accounting based measures, (ii) the ability of the 
firm to meet its cash flows forecast, (iii) and the need to restructure once more after 
emergence. She finds that firms' profitability does not increase significantly and that 
actual performance is worse than projected. Thirty-two percent of her sample firms 
need to restructure again post emergence. Retaining pre-bankruptcy management is 
significantly related to a poorer post-bankruptcy performance. 
Alderson and Betker (1999) examine the post-bankruptcy performance using cash 
flows based methods. The return on investment after liquidation is defmed as the 
benchmark for assessing the post-bankruptcy performance. They fmd that the cash 
flow return is greater than the return on the benchmark portfolios. Robustness analysis 
indicates that this result does not change with different methods of assessing firm 
value nor benchmarks. 
Hotchkiss (1995) and White (1994) argue that Chapter 11 tends to let 
economically inefficient firms continue to operate. Eberhart, Altman and Aggarwal 
(1999) suggest that even if firms perform poorly after emerging from bankruptcy 
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protection, they still perform better than what the market had expected them to 
achieve. They use various matched samples to estimate expected returns. They fmd 
that both average cumulative abnormal returns and median cumulative abnormal 
returns are positive and significant around the earnings announcements. 
While Hotchkiss (1995) focuses on the CEO retention effect, Dawley et al. (2003) 
consider the degree of diversification and firm size on post-bankruptcy outcome and 
recovery process length. They show that unrelated diversified firms have a greater 
probability of surviving from bankruptcy than related diversified firms. However, 
unrelated diversification results in longer recovery processes after bankruptcy. 
Jensen (1991) considers acquisition as another possible method to redeploy firms' 
assets. Instead of focusing on post-bankruptcy performance of Chapter 11 emerging 
firms, Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) investigate how acquisition applies to 
insolvent firms. They find that information asymmetry problems about target firms 
impede the acquisition. Bidders are less informed about the value of the target and the 
use of its assets. To reduce information asymmetry, most of the acquirers are in the 
same industry as the bankrupt targets. Acquisition in bankruptcy creates value, and the 
post-merger performance of the acquired firms is better than that of matched 
non-bankrupt firms as well as the post-bankruptcy performance for reorganized firms. 
Hotchkiss and Mooradian also document positive abnormal returns to both bidder and 
target at the announcement of the acquisition transaction. 
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CHAPTERm 
BANKRUPTCY PROCESS, COMPARISON BETWEEN CANADA 
AND THE U.S. 
3.1. Description of Bankruptcy Process under Chapter 11 
Chapter 11 is a chapter of the United States Bankruptcy Code which permits 
insolvent debtor to continue operating while a fmal solution is negotiated between 
involved parties. Alternatively, Chapter 11 enables the debtor a debt-in-possession 
privilege so that the bankrupt fIrm can continue operating while inhibiting creditors' 
collection ability of their claims against the distressed entity during the period of 
reorganization. 
When a fIrm fIles for protection under Chapter 11, the court gives the incumbent 
management 120 days to come up with a reorganization plan, and time extensions are 
frequently granted. The creditors can oppose extensions if they believe management is 
unable to provide realistic reorganization plan or is acting dishonestly. The creditors 
may also propose their own plan under some conditions when the exclusion period 
expires and the plan from the debtor has not been accepted by the creditors within 180 
days of fIling. 
In order for a reorganization plan to be approved, a majority of each class of 
creditors is required. Moreover, creditors representing two-thirds of the claimed 
amounts need to agree on the plan. An amended plan can be proposed if the original 
reorganization plan is not approved by the creditors. If the amended plan is not 
accepted, the creditors can request the judge to liquidate or distribute the assets among 
the claimants. In some cases where creditors are recalcitrant, the court can "cram 
down" a plan that requires claimants to be treated under the rule of absolute priority. 
However, the cases for "cram down" are rare since such a decision requires a long and 
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intensive hearing process to value the assets of the firm. 
For a reorganization plan to be confirmed, the absolute priority rule must be 
satisfied. Absolute priority rule requires that junior creditors should not receive any 
payment before the senior creditors are paid in full. 
3.2. The Canadian Bankruptcy Code BIA and CCAA 
In Canada, there are two different formal reorganization procedures: (1) the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and (2) the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. 
The Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act was introduced in December 1992 through a 
modification of Bankruptcy Act, which was enacted in 1919 and subsequently revised 
in 1949. The Bankruptcy Act was mainly based on the British Bankruptcy Act of 
1904. 
The 1992 revision was intended to encourage reorganization of distressed firms 
and thereby save jobs that would be lost if liquidation was the final solution. The 
revision comprises four principal changes. First, under the 1949 Act, in order for a 
reorganization plan to be approved, three-quarters of the total claims needed to be 
supported. Under the new Act, only two-thirds of the total claims are required to be in 
favor. Second, treatment to the secured creditors is changed. The secured creditors 
were not bound by the 1949 Act but are stayed for 30 days under the new Act. Third, 
under the 1949 Act, the federal and provincial claims (Crown claims) were to be paid 
before other unsecured creditors. Under the new Act, with some exceptions, the 
Crown priority is abolished. Fourth, wage claims for employees are raised from $500 
for wages and $300 for expenses to $2000 for wages and $1000 for expenses. 
Fisher and Martel (1994) examine the impact of the new 1992 Act. Despite an 
increase in acceptance rates of reorganization plans, the real effects of the reformed 
Act are quite small, due to the small number of jobs saved per year. 
The CCAA was enacted in 1933 to assist in the reorganization of insolvent 
companies. It was originally applied to all insolvent firms, however, due to a 1953 
amendment, the Act focuses on the firms that have outstanding secured or unsecured 
bonds. The CCAA is different from the BIA in several aspects. While the BIA process 
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is a statutory process, CCAA is more flexible and discretionary as the judge can make 
discretionary decisions. This feature results in larger corporations filing for 
bankruptcy under CCAA protection. A second important difference is that the CCAA 
does not have a time limit on the bankruptcy proceedings as the court can provide 
unlimited extensions for the firm under protection (under the BIA, total stay period 
cannot exceed six months). Third, BIA does not require any threshold of debt, 
whereas CCAA has a minimum of $5 million debt threshold. 
3.3. A Comparison of Bankruptcy Protection between the U.S. and Canada 
Despite the various similarities with regard to bankruptcy protection between the 
U.S. and Canada, there remains enough different features to make the two national 
systems distinct. 
First, under Chapter 11, a trustee can be appointed if the court fmds that the 
debtor is involved in inappropriate conduct, but this is not a mandatory act. In Canada, 
the appointment of a trustee is compulsory in every filing case (monitors play the 
similar role under the CCAA system). Second, treatment of secured creditors is 
different. Under Chapter 11, all creditors are bound by the stay of the proceedings 
following the bankruptcy filing, whereas secured creditors are not bound by the stay 
under the BIA and CCAA.4 In Canada, as long as the secured creditors believe that 
collecting their claims is preferable, they can realize their interest in the event of the 
insolvency. However, when it comes to the voting of the plan, the secured creditors 
cannot vote on the plan unless their claims are partially satisfied. Third, "cram down" 
can be used by the debtor (or creditor) under Chapter 11 whereas there is no such 
specific procedure under the BIA and CCAA. 
Fisher and Martel (1999) compare reorganization under the two different national 
systems. They fmd that the confirmation of the plans and the completion rates are 
significantly higher in Canada than under Chapter 11 in the U.S. They fmd however 
that the Canadian system became closer to the U.S. Chapter 11 after the 1992 
4 Secured creditors are given a stay of 30 days, but Fisher and Martel (2003) argue that the period is 
too short to have any effect on the bankruptcy process. 
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regulatory refonns. They argue that the 1992 refonns make the bankruptcy protection 
system less efficient because the new bankruptcy protection system assures the 
survival of unhealthy non viable finns which results in higher costs to Canadian 
economy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
Duration models are well specified to fit and explain data measuring the duration 
of various phenomena. Duration measured in time elapsed is usually a positive real 
number. Therefore, OLS estimation of regressing duration on various possible 
explanatory variables is ill specified as it leads to potential negative fitted or predicted 
duration measures conditional on the realization of the explanatory variables. For 
censored observations, the error term does not have conditional mean zero and is not 
uncorrelated with explanatory variables. The right censored observations makes OLS 
estimation inconsistent in our study. However, the duration models can deal with both 
the censored data and the duration time. 
In the sub-sections to follow, we first introduce the (conditional) survival and 
hazard functions. Second, functional forms of these models are proposed. Third, we 
discuss the general proportional hazard rate and accelerate failure models. Fourth, 
parametric models assuming the Weibull distribution and Log-logistic distribution are 
discussed. Fifth, Cox's proportional hazard model is presented. At last, we discuss the 
explanatory variables that are chosen in this study. 
4.1. Survival and Hazard Functions 
In this thesis we will develop the theory behind duration models shaping the 
probability that a firm exits from bankruptcy protection. We measure the duration of 
the bankruptcy state by T, a random variable with probability density function (PDF) 
given by J(t) and cumulative density function (CDF) given by F(t), where t IS a 
realization of T. Then the survival function is as follow 
Set) == 1- F(t) (1) 
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The unconditional probability that a state ends in any short period, say, between 
time t and t + tJ.t is; 
Pr(t < r :::; t + tJ.t) = F(t + tJ.t) - F(t) (2) 
The conditional probability that a firm exits in a short period, between t and 
t + tJ.t, conditional on having already reached time t, is defmed as 
Pre t < r < t + tJ.tlr > t) = F(t+!J.t)-F(t) 
- - Set) (3) 
In a continuous time framework, we can compute the limit of 
Pre t<'l':St+tJ.tl'l'~t) 
_":""-_-tJ.-t-":""'--:" as !J.t --+ 0 ,which is from (3) given by 
h(t)= J(t) 
Set) (4) 
h(t) in (4) is the hazard function. It is very common to focus and work on the 
hazard function rather than the survival or density function. 
Data on duration usually contain observations that are censored. Censoring can be 
either left or right type. An observation is right censored if it is still in the studied state 
(in our case the state is bankruptcy protection) when data collection or survey is 
stopped. Left censoring exists if a firm enters the survey while it is in the studied state. 
In our case, that means a fmn that is already in bankruptcy when we start collecting 
data.5 
For right censored observations, the likelihood can be seen as the probability that 
the duration exceeds ti (ti is the time that fmn i has already spent under bankruptcy 
protection), which is given by the survival function. For uncensored data, we derive 
the likelihood from (4). Let J denotes the set of uncensored observations. The 
log-likelihood of the total sample is given by 
5 As we have data on all firms in our sample, no observation is left censored. For more details on 
sample composition, see chapter V. 
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(5) 
Xi is the set of explanatory cross-section variables for observation i, Yti is the set of 
explanatory time variables and P are the parameters to be estimated. Xi is a vector 
of K covariates. Xi,k denotes the variable k for individual (observation) i.6 The 
parameters of the model are estimated by maximizing (5) or using the maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) approach. 
4.2. Proportional Hazard Model and Accelerated Failure Time Model 
Assume that the hazard rate for any given observation i in the sample data is 
given by the following expression: 
(6) 
The hazard rate is the product of two functions. The first function g(Xi) depends 
on the observation's characteristics. The second function h(t), known as the baseline 
hazard function, depends only on time. The implication of (6) is that the ratio of the 
hazards for any two observations i and j, depends only on their characteristics not 
time. The ratio is governed by 
In particular, let's assume that g(Xi) is determined by an exponential 
distribution, g(Xi) = exp(xiP), Then the hazard function (6) becomes 
6 We assume that x;,o is a vector of ones. Thus xd3 = (30 + (3iXi,l + (3zXi,2 + ... + +(3K-1Xi,K-l' 
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(7) 
(8) 
The issue now is defining a functional form for h(t). In reality, the distribution 
for the baseline hazard function is unknown. Econometric empirical studies of various 
phenomena adopted few simplistic models for the baseline hazard rate h(t). 
Accelerated failure time (AFT) model assumes that the baseline hazard increases 
as function of the observation's characteristics. AFT can take the following functional 
form: 
(9) 
We notice that the baseline hazard h[t9(XaJ depends on covariates Xi' Both the 
Weibull and the Log-logistic hazard models belong to the AFT family. 
4.3. Parametric Models 
The widely used parametric forms of duration are the Weibull and the 
Log~logistic distribution models.7 
4.3.1 The Weibull Distribution 
The Weibull distribution, which is parametric, belongs to the proportional hazard 
family functions. The hazard function with parameter b (b = ~) for individual i can 
be written as follow 
(10) 
The density function, survival function, and the CDF for this distribution are 
(11) 
7 Van de Gucht and Moore (1998) examine the duration ofleveraged buyouts and their reversal from 
the private state to the public state using two hazard functions. Tudela (2004) analyzes the probability 
of currency crises using duration based approach. He applies a Cox proportional model to test factors 
causing currency crises. Van der Goot et al. (2009) analyze the effects of the determinants on the 
survival time for internet IPOs. They use the Log-logistic based duration model. They also compare the 
results from Log-logistic duration model with those from Cox's proportional hazard model. 
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(12) 
(13) 
The baseline hazard function is btb - 1 . 8 From the hazard function we can 
observe that both the baseline hazard function and the effects of the explanatory 
variables are well specified. 
The estimates are obtained by maXImum likelihood estimation. The 
log-likelihood function is as follow 
Where m is the number of entities in J, which is the number of complete uncensored 
observations; n is the total number of observations or sample size. 
4.3.2 The Log-Logistic Distribution 
The Log-logistic duration model has a hazard function given by: 
Where a = exp Cilf) and captures the effect ofthe covariates. 
(f 
The density, survival, and cumulative density functions are 
(15) 
8 One can re-arrange the hazard function to where the baseline hazard is given by h(ti; b, (J) = 
b (t X exp (~) t-1 exp (X~) = h[tg(xDl X g(xa with b (t X exp (~) t-1 = h[tg(Xi)] and 
g(xa = exp C~). This latter expression shows that the Weibull based model is also accelerated failure 
model. 
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1 S(ti; a, a) = --1 
l+atO' 
1 F(ti; a, a) = 1---1 
l+atO' 
(16) 
. 
(17) 
(18) 
The shape for the distribution depends on the relative value of a compared to 1. 
The Log-logistic distribution produces an accelerated failure time (AFT) model. For 
an AFT model, the covariate effects are constant and multiplicative on the time. The 
covariate affects the hazard by a constant factor, which is the acceleration factor. If we 
set the survival function in (17) equal to 0.5 and solve the equation, assuming one unit 
increase in covariate k (1, ... , K - 1) while other variables are unchanged, we get an 
equation for the time ratio at the median9 
(19) 
The time ratio indicates the marginal effect of the specific covariate on the median 
survival time. The quantity exp (-Pk) is known as the acceleration factor. If the 
time ratio is greater than 1, it means that this covariate prolongs the restructuring 
duration. If it is less than 1, it implies that this variable shortens the protection process. 
The log-likelihood function for the Log-logistic duration model is 
(20) 
Where di equals one if the observation is fully observed or uncensored and zero 
9 At the survival value of 0.5, the corresponding time is the median duration. See Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (1999) for more details on the time ratio and acceleration rates. 
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otherwise. 
4.4. Semi-parametric Model 
Cox's Proportional Hazard Model is a semi-parametric model. It defines the 
functional form the hazard rate given the covariates, but makes no parametric 
specification about the density function of the duration. 
The Cox's proportional hazard model is defined as follow 
h(Xi. t) = h(t)exp (xii/) (21) 
Where P is the vector of coefficients to estimate, Xi is the (K dimension) 
covariates vector, h(t) is the baseline hazard function. The parameters are obtained 
by maximizing the log-likelihood function 
l( R) ~n d I [ exp (Xif3) ] t, f' = L..i=l i og ~. ( '13) 
£"jER(Yi) exp Xl 
(22) 
We use the Kaplan-Meier's Product-Limit estimator to fit the empirical survival 
function. lo 
4.5. Explanatory Variables 
Few studies investigated the determinants of bankruptcy duration in the U.S. We 
use these empirical studies as a starting point in selecting the explanatory covariates 
Xi' Specifically, we use several firm specific variables and market wide variables that 
have only a time dimension. In addition, we use some other variables based on the 
specificities of the Canadian framework. 
Firm size and age 
10 The Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survival function results in a declining flat linear step-wise 
function. The length of each horizontal step is defmed by the length of time between two successive 
uncensored duration observations. When a large enough sample is applied, the estimator will converge 
to the true survival function of the population. 
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Denis and Rodgers (2007), and Helwege (1999) use size as an explanatory 
variable for bankruptcy duration. The argument is that larger fIrms hold more debt 
thus need more time for negotiation. Our hypothesis is that there is a positive relation 
between size and bankruptcy protection duration. We measure the fIrm size by the 
logarithm of total assets from the balance sheet. 
We also consider the firm age or tenure as an explanatory variable. We argue that 
older firms are more likely to have more complex debt structures and more creditors 
and thus need longer time to exit from bankruptcy protection. 
Secured debt ratio 
The secured debt ratio is a measurement of firm's creditor structure. As noted, 
secured creditors are not bound by the stay under Canadian bankruptcy laws. It is 
assumed that secured creditors prefer liquidation to reorganization as they have 
priority over other creditors. Fisher and Martel (1995) find higher secured debt ratio 
yields to a higher probability of reorganization plan acceptance. They conjecture that, 
when unsecured creditors do not have enough information, they may observe the 
behavior of secured creditors. The acceptance of a plan from secured creditors may 
thus be viewed as a signal of positive prospects. In the present thesis, we focus on 
how this ratio affects the duration of an entity under bankruptcy protection. According 
to the absolute priority rule, unsecured creditors get their claims after the payment to 
secured creditors. In order to bargain for larger payment, the unsecured creditors can 
threaten to protract the protection process. A higher secured debt ratio indicates fewer 
unsecured creditors involved. Moreover, the signaling effect of secured creditors also 
suggests that a higher secured debt ratio results in shorter resolution duration. 
Leverage 
The leverage of the firm is defmed by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. It 
describes the firm's financial structure before bankruptcy filing. Higher leverage 
means more debt for the same assets. Creditors will have to negotiate harder to split 
the relatively smaller collateral (total assets) among themselves as they must accept a 
deeper discount. Hence, one can argue that bankrupt firms with higher leverage ratio 
may have to deal with more bargaining issues among stakeholders to find a solution. 
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Therefore, we expect firms with larger leverage ratio to stay longer under bankruptcy 
protection. Bandopadhyaya (1994) uses long term debt to assets ratio as a 
measurement for leverage. However, his fmdings show that this variable is not 
significantly related to the bankruptcy protection duration. 
Return s volatility 
Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of daily returns over one calendar 
year prior to filing for bankruptcy. We argue that if the volatility of total assets 
increases, then the value of equity itself increases as equity is similar to a call option 
on firm total assets. Higher equity reduces the bankruptcy risk. At the limit, the 
argument can force shareholders to more likely and willingly accept an arrangement 
with creditors to and thus save some salvage value that would be destroyed in case of 
liquidation. Similarly, creditors are likely interested in converting their debt into 
equity and reap the potential option value. However, a company that is already 
bankrupt indicates that the value of equity is already nil. Equity and assets' volatility 
may not have any value at this point in time. 
Net profit margin 
We define net profit margin as the ratio of firm's net income to sales. Higher net 
profit margin implies that the firm has greater ability to turn revenues into profits. We 
conjecture that firms with higher net profit margin are deemed viable and are primary 
targets for acquisition. Stakeholders tend to settle the bankruptcy issues quickly in 
order to preserve the firm's ability to turnover revenues into profits. Hence, we 
hypothesize that bankrupt firms with higher net profit margin spend less time under 
bankruptcy protection. 
Industry adjusted operating margin and industry median operating margin 
Following Denis and Rodgers (2007), we define the operating margin as the ratio 
of earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) over total assets (TA).l1 As suggested 
by Maksimovic and Phillips (1998), the industry health is a significant factor in 
affecting the fate of firms in fmancial distress. We consider the state of the industry by 
11 The ratio is also known as the return on assets (ROA). 
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including the industry median operating margin as an explanatory variable for the 
bankruptcy duration. We conjecture that flrms that operate in healthy economic 
sectors spend less time in bankruptcy protection as potential acquirer and debt holders 
see future opportunities in these flrms. Similarly, we conjecture that flrms that do 
better than their industrial benchmark spend less time in bankruptcy protection. The 
relative performance is measured by the industry adjusted operating margin (IAOM). 
We construct IAOM by matching the sample flrms with non flling flrms using the 
4-digit Standard Industry Classiflcation (SIC) Code. SIC codes are extracted from 
Compustat. The industry median operating margin is then calculated from the 
matched companies. If the same 4-digit SIC Code entities are not found for the flrm, 
then we use the 3-digit SIC Code for matching, and so on. The industry adjusted 
operating margin is obtained by subtracting the industry median operating margin 
from the sample flrm's operating margin. Data on EBI~ and TA are also extracted 
from Compustat. 
Default spread 
The default spread is measured as the yield differential between long-term 
corporate bond and the long-term government of Canada bond yields at the time 
before the firm's filing date. We use the data on the first day prior to the firm's flling 
date. Contrary to the previous variables, the default spread is a market wide variable. 
It shows no cross-sectional variation except for the passage of time. Larger default 
spread could be thought of as a systematic risk factor. 12 We hypothesize that periods 
with high default spreads are associated with higher bankruptcy risk and longer 
bankruptcy protection. When default spreads are high, the flight-to-quality effect 
implies that investors tend to buy higher quality securities and avoid investing in risky 
securities. This makes it difficult to rescue low quality flrms, and makes the 
restructuring duration longer. Conversely, with low credit spread during economic 
expansions, investors have a tendency to take more risk as their return is higher than 
12 Vassalou and Xing (2004) show that default is a systematic risk and that default should be priced. 
The appetite for risk hypothesis is predominant in the popular fmancial press. For tests of the appetite 
for risk hypothesis, please refer to Eichengreen and Mody (2000). 
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the less risky investments. They do not perceive risk similarly during contraction 
periods. Their increased appetite for risk makes default less likely and shortens 
bankruptcy duration when it occurs. 
Industrial production and GDP growth 
Industrial production is a highly pro-cyclical economic indicator. Hamilton and 
Lin (1996) argue that industrial production growth is related to economic conditions. 
They report that the industrial production growth declines sharply during economic 
recession. As such, we can infer the link between bankruptcy duration and economic 
activity using the growth in industrial production. We hypothesize that during periods 
of economic slowdowns or even recessions, bankruptcy filing intensity increases. 
Therefore, with busier institutional systems, it takes longer to finally settle the 
bankruptcy processes. Hence, we expect a negative relation between economic growth 
and bankruptcy duration. We also use GDP growth as an alternative measure to the 
economic activity proxy for robustness purposes. 
Interest rate 
Short term interest rate is also an economic indicator. Short rates are usually used 
by monetary authorities as an instrument to influence the economic activity. During 
economic downturns (expansions), central banks decrease (increase) short rates to 
stimulate consumption and investments (limit overheating of the economy). Hence 
and in accordance to the last paragraph, we expect a negative relation between short 
interest rates and bankruptcy duration. We proxy short interest rates by the 90-days 
rates on government of Canada Treasury Bills. 
Term spread 
Term spread is usually used in the macroeconomic literature to describe the state 
of the business cycle. It is also used to characterize the time series variation in returns 
(Chen et aI1986). High term spreads are associated with high expected inflation rates 
which indicates future economic recovery and expansion. Plosser and Rouwenhorst 
(1994) show that long rates have strong relation to future growth of industrial 
production. Dueker (1997) shows that the term structure has strong predictive power 
of economic recessions. Hence, high term spread suggests that current economic 
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conditions are more likely dire. We then expect term spread to have a positive impact 
on the bankruptcy duration. 
Control dummy variables 
As we have mentioned in Chapter III, there are differences between Chapter 11 
and Canadian Bankruptcy Code. In Canada, trustees or monitors are required in every 
bankruptcy filing case. More specifically, when a firm files for bankruptcy protection 
under BIA (CCAA), the trustee (monitor) is in charge of supervising and informing all 
parties about the successive events. We hypothesize that the quality of the trustee or 
monitor can influence the protection duration. For instance, high quality trustee with 
solid reputation can help reduce information asymmetry between parties involved in 
the default negotiation process. As a consequence, the process can be settled faster for 
either possible outcomes (reorganization, liquidation, acquisition etc.). In order to 
capture this potential effect, we introduce a dummy variable which equals one if the 
trustee or monitor belongs to one of the four largest accounting and professional 
services firms, and zero otherwise. The largest four firms are: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and KPMG. 
In Canada, firms can choose to file under either the BIA or the CCAA, provided 
that they satisfy filling conditions specifically the minimum $5 million debt 
requirement for CCAA. We propose to test whether the choice of both filing methods 
and jurisdictions can impact the bankruptcy protection duration. As discussed in 
section III, BIA is more restrictive procedure where extensions are not the rule as 
opposed to CCAA where judges have more discretion in providing extensions to 
parties to find solutions. We use a dummy variable to capture the difference in 
durations between the two distinct procedures. The variable takes value of one if the 
firm files under the CCAA, and zero otherwise. 
Furthermore, we also include a dummy variable that differentiates between firms 
listed on Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and other listing venues (TSX Venture 
Exchange and the Montreal Exchange). The variable is equal to one if the filing firm 
is listed on the TSX and zero otherwise. Most blue chip Canadian firms are listed on 
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the TSX. Finally, we construct four dummy variables to test whether the province 
where the headquarters of the filing firm are located matter in determining the 
protection duration. These binary variables are associated with the following 
provinces: Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia. 
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CHAPTER V 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
Our research is different from previous studies in the sense that the sample 
contains public fIrms fIled under BIA or CCAA in Canada. The sample selection 
process is tedious and time consuming because most of the fIrms fIled for bankruptcy 
protection are private entities with little publicly available data. We identify 145 
public fIrms that fIles for bankruptcy through multiple databases during the period 
1992-2009. Our sample contains 128 unique public fIrms with complete duration and 
resolution outcomes. Since one fIrm fIled twice under BIA in 1999 and 2002, we have 
129 observations as uncensored observations. Moreover, we identify 16 right 
censored observations that are still under bankruptcy at the end of 2009.13 
The sample selection procedure is as follow. First, we search for the fIrms that 
fIled for bankruptcy protection through Lexis-Nexis and Canadian Business & 
Current Affairs (CBCA) by using keywords such as "bankruptcy", ''bankruptcy 
protection", "BIA", and "CCAA" for the period 1992-2009. This process results in 
205 fmns/observations in total, among which 31 are privately held, 16 are still under 
restructuring as of January 31 st, 2010, and 30 are liquidated immediately on the fIling 
day. Therefore, the sample selection procedure results in 145 observations including 
the 16 censored cases. Table 1 details the number of fIlings by fmal outcome for each 
calendar year. We observe that there is a concentration of fIling for bankruptcy 
protection between 1999 and 2003. This may be caused by the crash of the dotcom 
bubble in year 2000 and subsequent and contemporaneous increase in business failure 
specifically in the high tech area. Conversely, no fum in our sample fIled under 
bankruptcy protection for the years 1993 and 1994. 
13 We would like to thank Efrim Boritz, Duane Kennedy and Jerry Sun for their kind support of the list 
of bankrupt companies. 
27 
[Please insert Table 1 about here.] 
Table 1 shows that there are 43 firms that reorganized from BIA or CCAA 
protection. We follow the 43 reorganized firms through the three years following 
reorganization (for firms that emerged from bankruptcy protection after the year 2006, 
we follow them through the end of this study). We fmd that two firms went private 
immediately after exiting from bankruptcy protection, while five firms were acquired 
within the three full years following reorganization. Among the 43 reorganized firms, 
one was liquidated in its third year following exiting, and one filed for bankruptcy 
protection again and is still under bankruptcy protection. 
The next step is to locate the exact dates of entering and exiting from bankruptcy 
protection. For bankrupt firms that are ultimately liquidated or acquired, we require 
the date of the court announcement. We manually collected data on these dates using 
various sources including the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval 
(SEDAR) and CBCA. Occasionally, when data was not available from these 
databases, we proceed to specific targeted search for these cases using various internet 
sources to faithfully report those dates. Duration of bankruptcy is measured as the 
number of days separating the filing for bankruptcy date and the release from the 
protection. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics on the sample duration used for the 
current thesis. The median value for the firms that reorganized is 281 days, which is 
longer than the median value of acquired firms (169 days) and liquidated firms (96 
days). We note that for all subsamples, the mean duration is higher than the median 
duration which documents that duration is positively skewed and is influenced by 
firms with extremely lengthy bankruptcy protection. To illustrate, Modatech Systems 
Inc spent almost five years in bankruptcy protection from November 1995 to 
September 2000. 
[Please insert Table 2 about here.] 
Our sample has shorter bankruptcy protection duration when compared with the 
sample in Denis and Rodgers (2007). The median duration values from Denis and 
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Rodgers (2007) are 597 days for the reorganized group, 502 days for the acquired 
group, and 276 days for the liquidated group. Denis and Rodgers (2007) use a sample 
that contains U.S. firms over the period 1985-1994, while our sample cover Canadian 
firms over the more recent period 1992-2009. 
We further compare the bankruptcy duration between (i) the three subsamples 
based on the bankruptcy outcome and (ii) the censored vs. uncensored groups. 
Columns (1) and (2) of panel A from table 3 shows that firms that were reorganized 
spent significantly longer time (mean of 412 days) under bankruptcy protection than 
those that were acquired or liquidated. Similar conclusion can be drawn from median 
Wicoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. Column (3) of the same panel shows that acquired 
firms spent also significantly longer time under protection than those who ultimately 
were liquidated. The multivariate test in panel b of table 3 shows that all three 
subsamples jointly have different bankruptcy durations according to both parametric 
Fisher and nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis statistical tests. Column (4) ofpand A from 
table 3 shows that censored observations have higher bankruptcy protection duration 
than uncensored observation according to both mean and median based tests. This 
result is somehow expected as censored observations are those that are still under 
bankruptcy when data is collected. 
[Please insert Table 3 about here.] 
We collected data on explanatory variables using various databases. Total assets, 
total liabilities, secured debt, net income, and the firm's SIC code are collected from 
the Compustat database. Some Canadian firms are not covered by the Compustat 
database. For these firms, we hand-collected the data from the financial statements 
recovered from the SEDAR system. As for the SIC codes and headquarter's province, 
we use Hoover's database and various web sites. All finns' accounting variables are 
collected from the latest annual report issued within one calendar year before the 
filing date. If no data is available for that particular year, the latest financial data 
before the filing date are used instead. In order to capture the industry effects on the 
insolvent entities, the industry adjusted operating margin is calculated by subtracting 
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the industry median operating margin from the fIrm's operating margin. The industry 
median operating margin is calculated for the same year as the fIrm's operating 
margin. The industry operating margin for each bankrupt fIrm is constructed using all 
other contemporaneous Compustat fIrms with the same 4-digits SIC Code. If we are 
not able to identify contemporaneous fIrms with the same 4-digits SIC Code as one 
bankrupt company, then we match instead using the last 3-digits SIC Code. This 
procedure is repeated until matching occurs using one-digit SIC code. In our fInal 
sample, there are 10 fIrms that are matched using 3-digits SIC Code, 13 fIrms are 
matched using 2-digits SIC Code, and 1 fIrm (censored observation) that is matched 
in the same 1-digit SIC Code. In order to identify the different sample bankruptcy 
procedures, we document the fIling information for each fIrm from SEDAR, and fInd 
whether the fIrm fIled for BIA or CCAA. We also record the trustee or monitor 
identity and the fIrm's inception date for each fIling case by searching SEDAR. In 
Canada, a trustee/monitor is required for each fIrm that fIled for bankruptcy protection. 
We collect the trustee/monitor information directly from the news report on the fIling 
date from SEDAR or CBCA. For the fIrms whose inception dates are not covered in 
SEDAR, we get the information from various websites including those published by 
the respective bankrupt fIrms. Age is measured as the duration time in years between 
the fInn's inception year and the bankruptcy fIling. 
Data on stock returns is collected from the Canadian Financial Markets Research 
Center (CFMRC) and the Datastream database. Standard deviation is calculated using 
daily return over one calendar year period before the fIrm's fIling date. For calculating 
the default spread, the long-term corporate bond indices yield and long-term 
government of Canada bond indices yield are recoded from Datastream and Canadian 
Socio-economic Information Management System (CANSIM) respectively. The yield 
on of long-term corporate bond index is from Scotia Capital Inc on the Datastream 
system. Both the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term government of 
Canada bond yield are reported on a weekly basis. For these two variables, we use the 
data that is closest in time to fIrm's fIling date to calculate the default spread. We 
defme the term spread as the differences between the long-term government of 
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Canada bond indices yield as describe above and the 90 day government of Canada 
Treasury Bill rate. Both rates are measured on the Wednesday preceding firm's filing 
date. The interest rate, the total industrial data, and the GDP data before firm's filing 
date are collected from CANSIM. We collect the listing venue information before or 
on firm's filing date either through CFMRC database or through TSX-Venture web 
site. Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics about our bankrupt firms' sample. We 
can clearly state that outliers are common in our sample as for instance the minimum 
and maximum values of internal liquidity (current assets over current liabilities) for 
the full sample are respectively at 0% and 4.420%.14 
[Please insert Table 4 about here. J 
Both the mean and median industry adjusted operating margins are statistically 
significantly negative. Panel A of table 4 shows that the mean industry adjusted 
operating margin is around -42%, suggesting that sample firms performed poorly 
compared with the industry median performance. The average sample firm has total 
assets of $483 million. The distribution of total assets is extremely skewed as the 
median finn has total assets of $49 million. I5 The mean leverage ratio, which is 
defined as total liabilities over total assets, is 1.059, which is greater than 1. The mean 
sample firm has more outstanding liabilities than assets to cover them. This is highly 
expected as an sample firms are in bankruptcy status. However, the median leverage 
ratio is 0.726, implying that there are extreme values that skew the mean leverage. 
The mean net profit margin is -4.329, implying that sample firms have very low 
(negative) efficiency in turning revenues into profits. Over 50% of sample firms have 
severe internal liquidity problems with negative working capital. The median current 
assets over current liabilities ratio is 0.87. We observe similar characteristics of 
explanatory variables in panel E as those in panel A which describe the subsamples 
based on final outcome and bankruptcy status when data collection was finalized. 
14 To address the outliers' issue, we winsorize our data using 1 % and 99% cut-off points. 
15 Few companies in our sample like Norte} Networks and Teleglobe had assets worth more than $ 8 
billion when filing for bankruptcy. 
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Firms perform poorly relative to their industry benchmarks as both the mean and 
median values of industry adjusted operating margin are negative. Moreover, we also 
find extreme values for the total assets, leverage ratio, net profit margin and internal 
liquidity, indicating that the outliers we found in panel A are robust to the ultimate 
bankruptcy outcome. In sum, the descriptive statistics in table 4 show that our sample 
firms are essentially in poor fmancial and economic situation. 
We further compare the variables among the three subsamples (the reorganized, 
the acquired, and the liquidated subsamples). The sample statistics and difference test 
statistics for the equality of mean and median tests are reported in panels B to D of 
table 4 and in table 5 respectively. Panel A of table 5 shows the results of mean and 
median comparison between the three groups. We use a Fisher based analysis of 
variance (Kruskal-Wallis test) to test for equality of means (medians). We can state 
that both our parametric and nonparametric statistical tests fail to reject the equality 
between the three groups in all cases but one. Only the mean age shows differences 
between the three groups at the 10% confidence level. We believe that the extreme 
heterogeneity of the group members with extreme values and high variability coupled 
with the small sample size highly reduce the power of our statistical tests. 
[Please insert Table 5 about here.] 
Panel B of table 4 shows that the mean industry adjusted operating margin for 
reorganized firms is -36.2% which is higher than that for the acquired firms at -63.6%. 
This indicates that the reorganized firms performed better in terms of their industry 
than the acquired firms. However, panel B of table 5 shows that this difference is not 
statistically significant. The median industry adjusted operating margin for the 
reorganized firms is higher than that for the acquired firms, but the test statistic is also 
insignificant. For paired-groups comparisons, we used the t-test (Wilcoxon Mann 
Whitney test) for equality of means (medians). 
Similar results are found for the leverage ratio, net profit margin measured as net 
income divided by sales, and liquidity measured as current assets over current 
liabilities. Although the mean leverage ratio for the reorganized firms is higher than 
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that for the other subsamples, the differences of the mean and median leverage ratio 
are not statistically significant for each pair ofthe three subsamples. 
The median value of total assets for the reorganized firms is $69 million, and it is 
higher than that of the other two subsamples. Reorganized firms seem to hold more 
assets than other firms. According to panels B and C of table 5, we do not [md 
significant differences of the median total assets between the three subsamples. The 
mean value of total assets for reorganized firms is however significantly higher than 
that for liquidated finns at the usual 5% confidence level. We may hint that larger 
firms are more likely to reorganize themselves whereas smaller firms with less assets 
are more easily acquired or liquidated as they involve less resources from the acquirer 
or the liquidator. 
The mean (median) firm age for the reorganized firms is 22 (15) years, which is 
significantly higher than that for liquidated firms subsample at 13 (9). This suggests 
that older firms are more likely to reorganize themselves and emerge as a new entity 
than to be liquidated. 
Table 6 reports the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables. From table 6 
we can observe that firm's total assets is correlated with the trustee dummy variable, 
CCAA dummy variable, TSX dummy variable, and finn age, mirroring that larger 
firms are usually older and employ bigger well known trustees. Consistent with 
previous discussion, larger firms are more likely to be listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange and tend to file under CCAA protection. Furthermore, larger [rnns usually 
have lower equity volatility. We should note however that the correlations are small in 
magnitude. Over 66 different correlation coefficients for the cross-section covariates, 
only two are higher than 0.5. The highest correlation is between (logarithm of) total 
assets and the CCAA dummy at 0.556. 
[Please insert Table 6 about here.] 
As expected, we observe significant correlations among some time series 
covariates as they describe the prevalent economic conditions. For instance, higher 
interest rates are related to lower term and default spreads. The two correlation 
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coefficients are strongly significant and have high absolute magnitudes at 0.746 and 
0.682 respectively. Moreover, there are (i) significantly negative correlation between 
default spread and industrial production growth at 0.65 and (ii) significantly positive 
correlation between interest rates and industrial production growth at 0.53. One can 
infer that periods of low economic activity are characterized by (i) low or negative 
growth in industrial production, (ii) low interest rates used as a tool to stimulate the 
economy, (iii) high term spread as a sign of higher long term interest rates or increase 
in interest rates after economic recovery (iv) and a high default spread indicating 
increased probability of default during economically dire periods. The latter relates 
also to market flight to safer assets when default risk materializes as actual 
bankruptcy occurs at these particularly difficult times. During economic expansion 
times, bankruptcy likelihood decreases. As a result, investors are willing to take more 
risk since the occurrence of bankruptcy is less likely. Therefore, the increased demand 
for risky assets reduces their required yield compared to safer securities and the 
default spread shrinks. We further discuss these mechanisms later in the thesis. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We estimate the three specified duration models by maximizing the log-likelihood 
in expressions (14), (20), and (22) for respectively the Weibull the Log-logistic and 
the Cox semi-parametric models. Finally, various tests are conducted to check the 
robustness of our empirical fmdings to various scenarios. 
6.1. Results with Full Sample 
Tables 7, 8, and 9 present respectively the results from the Weibull, the 
Log-logistic and the Cox proportional hazard based models. The tables report the 
coefficients and their respective standard errors on the explanatory for each hazard 
rate based model. 
Each column corresponds to a different specification for each model depending 
on the included explanatory variables. At the end of each run, pseudo adjusted R 
squared as proposed by Cox and Snell (1989) is computed. This measure of 
goodness-of-fit measure is given by 
R2 = 1- exp [~(LLo - LLp)] (23) 
Where LLo denotes the log-likelihood for the restricted model where all coefficients 
of explanatory covariates are zeros, while LL13 is the log-likelihood for the 
unrestricted fitted model. 16 
Table 7 shows that the age of firm has a significant impact on the duration. The 
coefficient on the (logarithm) of age ranges from -0.250 to -0.234 for the 5 models 
presented in table 7. We express the median survival time as a function of the 
16 This measure is similar to computing a likelihood ratio test to test for restriction that all coefficients 
are zero. 
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coefficients. The time ratio from expression (19) for the variable age is 1.2636 based 
on estimate from column 5 in table 7. This leads to the following statement: one unit 
increase in the logarithm of firm age increases the median protection time by 
26.36%.17 Hence, one can conclude that older firms are more likely to stay longer 
under bankruptcy protection before a fmal resolution is achieved. We argue that older 
firms have more complicated structure in terms of debt and more issues to settle, 
hence they need more time to complete their bankruptcy protection. Although a higher 
leverage ratio quickens the duration time, the impact is not statistically significant. In 
all five specifications in table 7, the coefficient on the leverage ratio is not statistically 
significant. This finding is consistent with Bandopadhyaya (1994). The leverage ratio 
is important in bankruptcy prediction studies, but its effect on bankruptcy protection 
duration is not prominent. 
Similar to the result from Denis et al. (2007), the industry adjusted operating 
margin is significant. Our results show that for all the estimated specifications in table 
7, the coefficient on the industry adjusted operating margin is significantly positive 
and ranges from 0.259 to 0.288. Based on column 5 of table 7 and holding other 
variables unchanged, one unit increase in the industry adjusted operating margin 
decreases the median protection time by 22.82%. The positive sign on the coefficient 
indicates that higher industry adjusted performance increases the hazard rate and 
hence boosts the likelihood of the firm exiting the bankruptcy protection state. Higher 
industry adjusted operating margin reduces the bankruptcy protection duration. This 
can be explained by the fact that firms with better performance are more likely to 
reorganize, be liquidated or acquired in a short time period or that the fate of 
successful fIrms is decided sooner. 
[Please insert Table 7 about here.] 
Table 7 reports that the default spread has a significant negative impact on the 
17 The coefficient on log of age from column 5 is -0.234. According to expression (19), the exponential 
of 0.234 equals 1.2636, indicating that this variable prolongs the bankruptcy protection duration. This 
value minus one results in the effect of log of age on the duration time. 
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hazard rate, which is consistent with our hypothesis. The estimate ranges from -0.446 
to -0.412. Wider default spreads yield to lower probability of leaving bankruptcy 
protection and hence increases the time that the fIrm needs to be discharged from 
bankruptcy protection. One unit increase in default spread increases the median 
protection time by 50.98%. Periods with low default spread are characterized by more 
risk taking behavior during upward markets}8 During these times, the increased 
appetite for risk lowers the yield on high risk securities as the demand increase. 
During such times, bankruptcy becomes unlikely and when occurs, it takes less time 
to resolve. On the contrary, when default spreads are large, yields on risky assets 
increase as investors fear more risk. The flight to higher quality assets renders the 
likelihood of restructuring marginal. Chalmers et al. (2010) support the notion of 
flight to quality effect. They fInd that investors flow away from equity fund and 
toward the money market funds during a major recession. Beber et al. (2009) fInd that 
investors care both the credit quality and the liquidity. They show that investors react 
distinctly at different times and for different reasons. 
CCAA variable shows the differential in hazard rate between fIrms that filed for 
bankruptcy under BIA and those that filed under the CCAA. The estimate is negative 
for all three specifIcations where the CCAA variable is included which indicates that 
fIrms that file under CCAA protection spends longer time in bankruptcy protection. 
This result confIrms our discussion in Chapter III, where we stated that there is no 
statutory time limit on the proceeding for fIrm files under CCAA. Estimates are 
however not statistically significant in table 7 using the Weibull distributional 
assumption. 
Higher secured debt ratio reduces the duration time is consistent with our 
hypothesis, but it is not statistically signifIcant. The coefficient on the secured debt 
ratio ranges from 0.206 to 0.230. Higher secured debt ratio implies that fewer 
unsecured creditors are involved, and this mitigates the bargain issue among the 
creditors. However, since unsecured creditors are always willing to protract the 
18 Chen et al. (1986) test for pricing of the default spread. Fama and French (1989) report that default 
spreads are related to economic conditions and can help predict returns. 
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bankruptcy protection process for more interests, higher secured debt ratio may not 
significantly quicken the process. 
The trustee variable is not significant. Appointing a trustee/monitor who is a 
priori highly regarded/respected does not guarantee a shorter stay in the bankruptcy 
status. We argue that it may be because these trustees/monitors are not as efficient as 
expected. Conversely, the higher requirement of transparency by these reputed 
trustees may also lengthen the bankruptcy protection process. These effects can offset 
the information transmission impact from the large accounting firms hence make this 
variable insignificant. 
The stock return volatility is positively related to the hazard, which confirms our 
hypothesis in Chapter IV. Firms with higher stock return volatility spend less time in 
bankruptcy protection. However, the estimation results show that it does not have a 
significant impact on the hazard rate. 
Table 8 shows the results from estimation of Log-logistic hazard model. Similar 
to those from the Weibull hazard model, the default spread is significant and has a 
negative impact on the hazard rate. A higher industry adjusted operating margin is 
associated with shorter resolution duration. Firms with greater age need longer time to 
discharge from bankruptcy protection. Compared with the results in table 7, the 
estimation coefficients for the three variables are larger. The estimates of the 
coefficient on the logarithm of firm age range from -0.283 to -0.265. Those of the 
default spread ranges from -0.503 to -0.468. 
[Please insert Table 8 about here.] 
The coefficient on the CCAA variable stays negative but becomes significant and 
confirms our previous hypothesis/findings. The estimate ranges from -0.598 to -0.557. 
The negative relation between CCAA dummy variable and the hazard rate implies that 
firm that file for bankruptcy under the CCAA system spend longer time in bankruptcy 
protection compared to those that file under the BIA system. The fact that there is no 
statutory time limit on the proceeding for firm files under CCAA may lead to longer 
protection duration. 
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The interpretation of the coefficient estimates for the Log-logistic hazard model 
is similar to that of the Weibull hazard model. Using the coefficient on CCAA 
variable from the fifth specification, we can compute the time ratio to be 1.818. Hence, 
the median protection time for firms that filed under CCAA is 1.818 times the 
protection time of the firms filed under BIA 
, 
The scale parameter ranges from 0.652 to 0.673. From Chapter N we find that 
the inverse of the scale parameter captures the evolution of the hazard. Since the 
inverse of the scale parameter is greater than one, we conclude that the hazard is 
inverted U-shaped. 
Table 9 presents the estimation results of Cox's proportional hazard model that 
abandons the parametric form of the baseline hazard function for the duration. We 
observe sensibly similar results as those from Weibull hazard model. The default 
spread and industry adjusted operating margin are significant. However, the 
significance level of the industry adjusted operating margin falls. The estimates of the 
coefficient on industry adjusted operating margin range from 0.238 to 0.265. Firm age 
variable continues to play a significant role in determining the bankruptcy protection 
duration. CCAA variable is still negatively (positively) related to the hazard 
(bankruptcy duration) but again insignificantly. Since Cox's proportional hazard 
model has proportional hazards, we can express the marginal effects of the variables 
as a hazard ratio. Using the hazard function (21), and holding other variables 
unchanged while increase one unit of a specific variable k, the hazard ratio becomes 
(24) 
The estimation coefficient on the default spread for the fifth specification is 
-0.447. A one unit increase in the default spread gives a reduction in the hazard by 
36.05% when other variables are kept unchanged. 19 
[Please insert Table 9 about here.] 
19 The exponential of -0.447 is 0.6395. Since a hazard ratio with value less than one indicates it reduces the hazard 
rate, we use one minus this value to calculate its effect on the hazard. This gives us 0.3605. 
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To summarize, we fmd that the default spread is strongly indicative of an 
increased duration time. Firm's performance compared to its industry is important.in 
determining its bankruptcy duration time. Furthermore, firm age is positively related 
to the bankruptcy protection duration. These results hold overall across the three 
models. Though the sigma variable is positively related to the hazard, it is not 
significant across all three models. The estimation results of Log-logistic hazard 
model show that firms that filed for bankruptcy under CCAA legislation spend longer 
time under bankruptcy protection. However, the coefficients are insignificant when 
the Weibull and Cox's proportional hazard models are applied. The leverage ratio is 
not related to bankruptcy duration when we account for other factors, indicating that 
the hazard of exiting from bankruptcy protection is insensitive to the firm's capital 
structure. This is consistent with the results from Bandopadhyaya (1994). We fail to 
observe a significant positive impact of the secured debt ratio on the hazard rate. 
Finally, firms that hired large and known trustees/monitors do not spend less time in 
bankruptcy protection. 
6.2. Effect of Bankrupt Firm's Province 
We test here whether different firms' headquarters physical location and hence 
bankruptcy filing court location have an impact on the bankruptcy duration process. 
All our bankrupt firms have their headquarters in either Quebec Ontario British 
Columbia Alberta or Nova Scotia provinces. To that end, we construct four dummy 
variables to account for the fIrst mentioned four provinces and leave Nova Scotia as 
the base case. Table 10 presents the estimates of Wei bull hazard model including these 
location variables. Table 10 shows that coefficient estimates are similar to those from 
table 7 for variables other than locations themselves. Age, industry adjusted operating 
margin, and default spread are still significantly (positively, negatively and positively 
respectively) related to the bankruptcy protection duration. However, location 
variables are not significantly related to bankruptcy protection duration. 
[Please insert Table 10 about here.] 
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Table 11 presents the results from the estimation of the Log-logistic hazard 
function using the location variables. Inference and conclusions drawn from table 11 
are identical to those of table 8 with respect to the significant determinants of the 
hazard rate. Similarly to inference from table 10, location dummy variables are not 
significantly affecting bankruptcy duration. 
[Please insert Table 11 about here.] 
Table 12 provides estimation results of Cox's proportional hazard model with 
location variables. The results are again identical to those reported in table 9 for the 
initial set of explanatory covariates. As for location variables, as tables 10 and 11 
show, headquarters' province does not impact the bankruptcy duration. 
[Please insert Table 12 about here.] 
To summarize the results of this sub-section, we conclude that tables 10, 11, and 
12 present similar results as tables 7, 8, and 9. Headquarters' location does not affect 
the duration of the bankruptcy. We conclude that no significant difference exists 
between various provincial jurisdictions with respect to the bankruptcy protection 
duration. 
6.3. Effect of Ignoring Right Censored Observations 
We find that periods where default spreads are high are associated with longer 
bankruptcy protection duration. The 2008-2009 period is associated with higher than 
usual default spread as volatility spiked and fmancial crisis and economic recession 
took place. That particular period is also associated with our censored observations as 
this is the end of our sample period. Therefore, to test for the robustness of our 
previous results, we run our models using uncensored data only. Tables 13, 14, and 15 
show the results for uncensored data using respectively the Weibull, the Log-logistic, 
and the Cox's proportional hazard models. Although the firm's age and its industry 
adjusted operating margin are still significantly affecting the bankruptcy duration as 
before, default spread is no longer significant. 
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[Please insert Tables 13, 14, and 15 about here.] 
6.4. Effect of Outliers 
Tables 2 and 4 clearly show that there are outliers in our sample of bankrupt 
firms. Outliers can impact our estimation. Instead of trimming an already small 
sample and as suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996), we winsorize our data. We set 
the ratios below the I % percentile and the above the 99% percentile to respectively 
the 1% percentile and the 99% percentile values. Tables 16, 17, and 18 present results 
using winsorized data for respectively the Weibull, the Log-logistic and the Cox's 
proportional hazard rate models. We find that most of our results are robust to outliers 
except for the industry adjusted operating margin. The latter variable becomes 
significant only for the Weibull based model (significance in two out of five tested 
specifications). 
[Please insert Tables 16, 17, and 18 here.] 
In sum, our findings are robust after dealing with the outliers. Firms that file for 
bankruptcy (i) under CCAA regulation (ii) when they are older (iii) when they deeply 
underperform their industry benchmark and (iv) during periods of high default spread 
experience longer bankruptcy protection duration. 
6.5. Effect of Other Market Variables 
Our previous results showed that the default spread is a significant determinant of 
bankruptcy protection duration in Canada. As discussed in chapter V, default spread is 
correlated to other market wide covariates. In order to capture other market effects on 
the bankruptcy duration, we include the industrial production growth rate and the 
interest rate as two additional explanatory variables. Tables 19, 20, and 21 report 
estimation results with these two market wide variables by using the Weibull, the 
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Log-logistic, and the Cox's proportional hazard models respectively.20 We also 
estimate the models using either of the quarterly GDP growth immediately before 
filing for bankruptcy or the year-to-year GDP growth and found that neither of these 
variables is significantly related to bankruptcy duration. We draw same conclusion 
with regard to the term spread variable. 
Columns (1) to (3) of tables 19 to 21 show that default spread, interest rate, and 
industrial production growth rate are significantly related to the bankruptcy protection 
duration when used as a sole economic indicator variable. Columns (4) and (5) show 
that the statistical significance largely drops when we use these three variables jointly. 
The latter result is caused by the multicollinearity that is documented in table 6. 
Multicollinearity inflates the standard errors and causes estimates to become 
inefficient. 21 
[Please insert Tables 19,20, and 21 here.] 
Columns (2) of tables 19, 20, and 21 show that the industrial production growth 
rate has a significant positive effect on the hazard rate. We conclude that firms spend 
longer time under bankruptcy protection during periods with low industrial production 
or low economic activity as IP growth is extremely pro-cyclical. During economic 
downturns, more firms face even more difficult situations as the commonality in 
default increases. As a result, courts face a higher rate of bankruptcy filing. Busier 
courts spend more time to study and rule for bankruptcy applications. Columns (3) of 
table 19 to 21 show positive relation between the interest and the hazard rates. As we 
discussed earlier in chapter V, interest rates are usually low during economically 
troubled times. Monetary policy is eased particularly at these specific times to 
encourage investment and consumption. Therefore, our argument relating prevailing 
economic conditions and bankruptcy duration still hold with regard to interest rate 
20 We also include the other variables such as the trustee, CCAA and TSX dummy variables, log of 
total assets, sigma, and secured debt ratio which are still not significant. For simplicity, estimations in 
tables 19 to 21 drop these variables. 
21 As an alternative, we orthogonalize the variables by linearly regressing industrial production growth 
on default spread then the interest rate on the default spread and the residuals from the first regression. 
We use the default spread and the residuals from both former regressions in our duration models 
estimation. We fmd that only the default spread is significant under these conditions. 
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levels. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Filers for bankruptcy protection try to work out a reorganization plan with their 
different creditors and stakeholders to survive. The protection period grants them the 
ability to escape creditors' claims for some time. For obvious reasons, managers 
prefer to have a long enough protection to bring the bankrupt ftrm into viable path. 
However, by the same token, longer protection reduces the incentives of creditors to 
seek a solution that will lead to the survival as they take much more risk in that case. 
In other words, the longer the bankruptcy duration, the higher are the bankruptcy 
costs. 
The present thesis investigates the following research question: what determines 
the length ofthe bankruptcy protection for a given firm? 
Previous literature tried to answer this particular question. Using mainly U.S. data, 
various papers identifted possible ftrm characteristics and market conditions that 
impact the bankruptcy duration. The current thesis builds on this literature to explain 
the cross-section and time variation of the bankruptcy duration for Canadian ftrms. 
Canadian framework is extremely interesting. First of all, using a fresh data set 
can avoid the data mining issue. Using fresh data will reduce biases caused through 
ftshing for explanatory variables after identifying those that are statistically signiftcant 
in explaining the herein studies phenomena. Second, Canadian bankruptcy rules are 
somehow similar to the U.S. proceedings with speciftc differences. Hence, we can use 
that to test for speciftc differences in legislations to identify the potential impact on 
the bankruptcy duration. The present thesis contributes to the literature by using 
various econometric speciftcations for the duration models and the hazard rate. We 
also use new variables that were not tested in early literature. 
Our empirical ftndings show that the default spread, industrial production growth 
or short interest rates, the industry adjusted operating margin and the ftrm's tenure are 
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significant factors in explaining bankruptcy duration using three different hazard 
models. The default spread has a negative impact on the hazard rate. More specifically, 
wider default spreads lengthen the bankruptcy protection time. We explain this 
phenomenon by the flight to quality during economically challenging times. When 
risk aversion is high, the yields on lower quality investment instruments are high as 
investors bid for higher quality securities. As a consequence, rescue for bankrupt and 
hence lower quality firms is delayed. Moreover, economic downturns measured by 
low industrial production growth or low interest rates are characterized by increased 
default occurrence and hence longer bankruptcy durations. 
We also fmd that the industry adjusted operating margin is positively related to 
the hazard rate. Firms that perform better within their respective industries need less 
time to reach final resolutions. It is possible that firms that perform well are easy to 
spot, and they are quickly acquired or liquidated. Firms' age slow down the resolution 
process. We believe that older firms have more complex structures and supplementary 
issues to deal with. Consequently, they need longer time to exit from bankruptcy 
protection. 
Our results show that the capital structure does not have significant impact on the 
hazard rate. The leverage ratio is not significant either in all our estimation results. 
This fmding provides an indirect support to Bandopadhyaya (1994). Though the 
leverage ratio may be an important factor in predicting bankruptcy, it does not have a 
significant impact on the bankruptcy duration. The secured debt ratio retains its 
positive effect on the hazard rate over all duration regressions but is not statistically 
significant. Although there are less severe bargain issues for a frrm with a higher 
secured debt ratio, unsecured creditors can still protract the bankruptcy protection 
process. The CCAA dummy variable is negatively related to the hazard rate across all 
the Log-logistic hazard models. We explain this result by the fact that the CCAA 
procedure is more flexible and does not have time limit in the duration. We fail to 
observe a significant effect of the trustee dummy variable over all the hazard models. 
It is possible that these trustees/monitors do not perform as well as they are expected. 
The large professional frrms may also have higher requirement of transparency to 
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supervise the bankruptcy procedures. These effects may lead the information 
transmission effect to be insignificant. 
We find that including the location variables does not have significant impact on 
the estimation results, and adjusting for outliers of explanatory ratios reduces the· 
effects of industry adjusted operating margin. 
I 
Finally, the default spread turns out to be non significant when we exclude the 
censored observations. However, since including more observations can enlarge our 
sample size leading to the reduction of the sample selection bias and increasing the 
statistical testing power, we believe that it is necessary to include these censored data 
in our estimation. 
According to these findings, the future studies should consider exploring market 
and industry variables in explaining firm's bankruptcy protection duration. For firm 
specific factors, the finn age and bargain issues within creditors and stockholders may 
be good determinants. The future studies can explore new factors that capture these 
effects. At last, the comparatively small sample set restricts the power of our tests, the 
future studies should consider constructing larger bankruptcy filing sample to improve 
statistical inferences. 
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Table 1: Bankruptcy Filing Outcome 
This table reports the initial filing by year and the outcomes for firms filing for bankruptcy 
protection. Panel A reports the initial filing for firms that have finished their bankruptcy protection. 
Panel B provides the initial filing for firms that are still under bankruptcy protection as of January 
31,2010. Firms' filing information are hand collected from Lexis-Nexis by entering the key words 
"bankruptcy", "bankruptcy protection", "BIA", and "CCAA". Then CBCA is applied in the same 
method as the previous database. Among the observations with the resolution outcomes, there are 
128 distinct firms with one that filed twice under BIA in 1999 and 2002, thus this gives us 129 
uncensored observations. The dates of the filing and outcomes are collected from Lexis-Nexis, 
CBCA, and SEDAR news reports. 
Panel A. Initial bankruptcy filing and outcomes 
Year Reorganized Acquired 
1992 0 1 
1993 0 0 
1994 0 0 
1995 2 0 
1996 1 0 
1997 2 0 
1998 1 
1999 2 3 
2000 2 2 
2001 3 2 
2002 6 3 
2003 8 3 
2004 1 3 
2005 3 0 
2006 2 2 
2007 3 
2008 6 4 
2009 3 1 
Total 43 28 
Liquidated 
o 
o 
o 
o 
5 
4 
10 
9 
10 
7 
4 
3 
o 
2 
58 
Panel B. Initial bankruptcy filing for censored observations 
Year 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Total 
Total 
1 
5 
10 
16 
Note: The Plaintree Systems Inc. filed under BIA protection in 1999 and 2002. 
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Total 
o 
o 
3 
7 
6 
15 
13 
15 
16 
15 
7 
4 
5 
4 
12 
5 
129 
Table 2: Bankruptcy Filing Duration 
The table lists summary statistics of duration for the uncensored and censored observations. The 
uncensored observations are the firms that have finished their protection procedures, and the 
censored observations are the finns that are still under bankruptcy protection as of January 31, 
2010. There are 128 finns fmished their protection with one finn that filed twice under BIA in 
1999 and 2002. We calculate the duration by getting the filing date and discharge date from 
Lexis-Nexis, CBCA, and SEDAR. The duration is characterized in days. 
Panel A. Bankruptcy protection duration for uncensored observations (n=129) 
Days in protection Reorganized Acquired Liquidated All 
Mean 412.279 218.679 147.759 251.326 
Std. Dev 342.912 205.014 174.142 273.405 
Min 48.000 14.000 3.000 3.000 
25% 164.000 91.500 29.000 84.000 
Median 281.000 169.000 96.000 173.000 
75% 607.000 218.000 183.000 314.000 
Max 1789.000 976.000 1081.000 1789.000 
Panel B. Bankruptcy protection duration for censored observations (n=l6) 
Days in protection All 
Mean 394.438 
Std. Dev 165.573 
Min 227.000 
25% 291.500 
Median 370.500 
75% 425.500 
Max 914.000 
54 
Table 3: Bankruptcy Filing Duration Statistical Tests 
This table reports the statistical test results for the mean and median durations difference between 
the three bankrupt fIrm subsamples split by their fInal outcome: reorganized (43 cases), acquired 
(28 cases), and liquidated (58 cases) fIrms, and between the censored (16 cases) and the 
uncensored (129 cases) fIrms. In Panel A, column 1, 2, and 3 show results for the pairs 
reorganized-acquired, reorganized-liquidated, and acquired-liquidated fIrms, respectively. Column 
4 presents the results for the pair censored-uncensored fIrms. Panel B shows the multivariate 
comparison between the three (reorganized, acquired, and liquidated) groups. Mean Diff (Median 
Dift) is the mean (median) duration difference between each pair of subsamples. Wilcoxon is the 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test for equality of the median between two groups, and t-stat is the 
usual Student's t test for equality of the mean between two groups. K-W stat is the Kruskal-Wallis 
test for equality of the median between the three groups. F stat is the Fisher test for equality of the 
mean between the three groups. 
Statistics (1) 
Panel A. Two groups tests 
Mean Diff 193.600 
t-stat 2.687 
p-value 0.009 
MedianDiff 112.000 
Wilcoxon 3.077 
p-value 0.002 
Panel B. All three groups tests 
F-stat 
p-value 
K-Wstat 
p-value 
(2) 
264.520 
5.065 
0.000 
185.000 
5.302 
0.000 
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14.259 
0.000 
30.317 
0.000 
(3) (4) 
70.920 143.112 
1.669 2.044 
0.099 0.043 
73.000 197.500 
2.147 3.692 
0.032 0.000 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Bankrupt Firms 
This table reports summary statistics for Canadian bankrupt firms for the period 1992-2009. Firm 
specific variables are collected from Compustat and SEDAR. Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is 
calculated as the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Total assets (TA) is measured in $ million. 
Leverage is computed as total liabilities over total assets. Age is measured in years from the 
inception to the bankruptcy filing date. Net income (NI) and sales are from the firms' income 
statement the year preceding the bankruptcy filing. Liquidity is measured as current assets over 
current liabilities. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is calculated by subtracting the 
median operating margin of the firms that have the same SIC Code as the sample firm one year 
before the filing. For the sample firms that we do not have the same 4-digit SIC Code, the same 
3-digit SIC Code is chosen, and so on. Operating Margin is defined as the operating income before 
depreciation divided by total assets. 
Statistics IAOM SDR TA Leverage Age NIlS ales CAlCL 
Panel A. Full Sample 
Mean -0.419 0.221 482.502 1.059 15.938 -4.329 1.477 
Std. Dev 0.993 0.248 1500.214 2.241 16.242 25.259 3.933 
Min -7.947 0.000 0.051 0.042 1.000 -283.758 0.000 
25% -0.268 0.001 16.518 0.486 5.000 -1.646 0.342 
Median -0.111 0.109 48.641 0.726 11.000 -0.455 0.870 
75% -0.022 0.393 181.558 1.029 21.000 -0.066 1.496 
Max 0.673 0.872 8837.000 26.306 94.000 0.709 44.420 
Panel B. Firms that reorganize 
Mean -0.362 0.185 639.905 1.455 21.558 -1.794 1.195 
Std. Dev 0.812 0.215 1534.570 3.937 20.317 3.697 1.106 
Min -3.653 0.000 0.051 0.042 2.000 -21.156 0.003 
25% -0.271 0.002 16.736 0.419 8.250 -2.559 0.337 
Median -0.057 0.109 69.375 0.727 15.000 -0.514 1.115 
75% 0.001 0.290 371.006 1.128 26.750 -0.101 1.634 
Max 0.673 0.798 7416.000 26.306 94.000 0.709 5.l89 
Panel C. Firms that are acquired 
Mean -0.636 0.240 455.660 0.745 16.786 -2.500 1.154 
Std. Dev 1.110 0.294 1606.337 0.423 16.663 8.292 1.182 
Min -4.506 0.000 1.638 0.254 2.000 -42.703 0.081 
25% -0.640 0.004 8.453 0.481 7.500 -1.692 0.299 
Median -0.177 0.086 56.710 0.643 11.000 -0.387 1.009 
75% -0.018 0.435 139.457 0.909 18.500 -0.048 1.444 
Max 0.146 0.872 8479.000 1.997 73.000 0.325 4.824 
56 
Panel D. Firms that are liquidated 
Mean -0.380 0.253 194.692 1.002 12.655 -7.420 1.245 
Std. Dev 1.142 0.258 592.286 0.970 12.945 38.854 2.193 
Min -7.947 0.000 0.222 0.067 1.000 -283.758 0.000 
25% -0.208 0.002 17.574 0.551 4.000 -0.994 0.408 
Median -0.106 0.202 47.568 0.748 9.000 -0.262 0.789 
75% -0.029 0.467 148.846 1.065 18.000 -0.037 1.187 
Max' 0.341 0.857 4272.300 6.078 84.000 0.064 15.551 
Panel E. Uncensored observations 
Mean -0.430 0.228 399.741 1.097 16.519 -4.506 1.208 
Std. Dev 1.034 0.253 1229.763 2.370 16.850 26.597 1.685 
Min -7.947 0.000 0.051 0.042 1.000 -283.758 0.000 
25% -0.282 0.002 14.611 0.486 5.750 -1.530 0.351 
Median -0.111 0.131 48.641 0.727 11.000 -0.340 0.840 
75% -0.018 0.390 175.710 1.029 21.250 -0.051 1.486 
Max 0.673 0.872 8479.000 26.306 94.000 0.709 15.551 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Bankrupt Firms Statistical Tests 
This table reports the statistical test results between the three bankrupt finn groups: reorganized 
(43 cases) acquired (28 cases) and liquidated (58 cases) finns. Panel A shows the multivariate 
comparison between the three groups. Panels B, C, and D respectively show results for the pairs 
reorganized-acquired reorganized-liquidated and acquired-liquidated firms. We test the differences 
in the following variables. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is calculated by 
subtracting the median operating margin of the finns that have the same SIC Code as the sample 
finn one year before the filing. For the sample firms that we do not have the same 4-digit SIC 
Code, the same 3-digit SIC Code is chosen, and so on. Operating Margin is defined as the 
operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is 
calculated as the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Total assets (TA) are measured in 
$ million. Leverage is computed as total liabilities over total assets. Age is measured in years from 
the inception to the bankruptcy filing date. Net income (NI) and sales are from the finns' income 
statement the year preceding the bankruptcy filing. Liquidity is measured as current assets over 
current liabilities. Data is collected from Compustat database and from SEDAR. K-W is the 
Kmskal-Wallis test for equality of the median between the three groups. F is the F test for equality 
of the mean between the three groups. Wilcoxon is the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test for equality 
of the median between two groups, and t is the t test for equality of the mean between two groups. 
Statistics IAOM SDR TA Leverage Age NIlS ales CAlCL 
Panel A. All three groups 
F-stat 0.711 0.951 1.673 0.845 3.591 0.631 0.029 
p-value 0.493 0.389 0.192 0.432 0.030 0.534 0.971 
K-Wstat 3.728 1.074 1.266 1.676 7.182 1.377 0.549 
p-value 0.155 0.584 0.531 0.433 0.028 0.502 0.760 
Panel B. Reorganized vs acquired firms 
t-stat 1.198 -0.916 0.485 0.949 1.036 0.481 0.150 
p-value 0.235 0.363 0.629 0.346 0.304 0.632 0.881 
Wilcoxon 1.606 0.288 0.700 0.371 1.241 0.663 0.512 
p-value 0.108 0.773 0.484 0.711 0.215 0.508 0.609 
Panel C. Reorganized vs liquidated firms 
t-stat 0.087 -10417 2.019 0.845 2.684 0.934 -0.136 
p-value 0.931 0.160 0.046 0.400 0.009 0.353 0.892 
Wilcoxon 0.869 1.116 1.123 0.766 2.637 1.158 0.704 
p-value 0.385 0.264 0.262 0.444 0.008 0.247 0.481 
Panel D. Acquired vs liquidated firms 
t-stat -0.982 -0.213 1.098 -1.340 1.260 0.637 -0.205 
p-value 0.329 0.832 0.276 0.184 0.211 0.526 0.838 
Wilcoxon 1.636 0.318 0.051 1.304 1.124 0.299 0.106 
p-value 0.102 0.751 0.960 0.192 0.261 0.765 0.916 
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables 
This table reports the correlation matrix for the independent variables. The sample contains 145 firms. Trustee is a dummy variable and equals 
one if the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four biggest accountancy and professional services firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA 
variable is a dummy variable equal one (zero) if the firm files for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (BIA) regulations. TSX variable is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the filing firm is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. Secured Debt Ratio 
(SDR) is calculated as the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Total assets (TA) is measured in $ million. Leverage is computed as total 
liabilities over total assets. Coverage Ratio (CR) is calculated as the ratio of Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to interest expenses. Age 
is measured in years from the inception to the bankruptcy filing date. Sigma is the standard deviation of the firm's stock returns during the one 
year period before the filing date. Net income (NI) and sales are from the firms' income statement the year preceding the bankruptcy filing. 
Default Spread (DS) is defined as the differences between the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term government of Canada bond 
yield at the time before the firm's filing date. Term Spread (TS) is measured by the differences between the long-term government of Canada 
bond yield and the 90 day government of Canada T-bill rate at the time before the firm's filing date. Industry Median Operating Margin (10M) 
for each bankrupt firm is constructed using all other contemporaneous Compustat firms with the same 4-digits SIC Code. Industry Adjusted 
Operating Margin (lAOM) is calculated by subtracting the median operating margin of the firms that have the same SIC Code as the sample firm 
one year before the filing. For the sample firms that we do not have the same 4-digit SIC Code, the same 3-digit SIC Code is chosen, and so on. 
Operating Margin is defined as the operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Interest Rate (IR) is measured by 3 month 
Canadian Treasury Bill rate from CANSIM at the time before the firm's filing date. Market Return (MR) is measured by S & PITSX composite 
index from Datastream at the time before the firm's filing date. GDP Growth Rate (GDPG) is based on the two successive quarters before the 
firm's filing quarter and GDP data is the unadjusted 2002 constant price from CANSIM. Industrial Production Growth Rate (IPG) is calculated 
between two successive quarters before the firm's filing quarter and total industrial data is from CANSIM. a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Variable Trustee CCAA TSX L(Age) Sigma L(TA) SDR Leverage CR NM 10M IAOM DS TS IR MR GDPG lPG 
Trustee 1.000 
CCAA 0.394c 1.000 
TSX 0.089 0.253c 1.000 
L(Age) 0.105 0.056 0.235c 1.000 
Sigma -0.152- -0.286c -0.217b -0.157- 1.000 
L(TA) 0.313c 0.556c 0.490c 0.179b -0.470c 1.000 
SDR 0.177b 0.026 -0.138" -0.128 0.036 -0.074 1.000 
Leverage 
-0.098 -0.132 -0.137- -0.018 0.235c -0.331 c -0.029 1.000 
CR 0.022 0.126 0.070 -0.019 -0.055 0.230c 0.140 -0.035 1.000 
NM -0.073 -0.063 -0.045 0.060 -0.011 -0.028 0.040 0.067 -0.006 1.000 
10M 0.010 0.171b 0.030 -0.145- -0.078 O.l77b 0.236c -0.011 0.110 -0.035 1.000 
IAOM 0.170b 0.333c 0.098 0.076 -0.304c 0.511 c 0.102 -0.378c 0.260c -0.011 0.155- 1.000 
DS 0.062 0.061 -0.048 -0.068 0.114 0.116 -0. 170b -0.078 -0.220b -0.252c -0.121 -0.007 1.000 
TS 0.031 0.013 -0.108 0.052 0.134 -0.047 -0.222c 0.013 -0.050 -0.106 -0.159- -0.099 0.304c 1.000 
IR -0.070 -0.078 0.134 0.033 -0.072 0.005 0.224c 0.087 0.120 0.162- 0.165b 0.054 -0.682c -0.746c 1.000 
MR 0.037 0.092 -0.171b 0.035 0.032 -0.073 0.222c 0.209b 0.136 0.087 0.189b -0.124 -0.374c -0.050 0.156- 1.000 
GDPG -0.044 -0.047 0.208b 0.010 0.041 -0.088 -0.017 -0.018 -0.044 -0.035 -0.049 -0.006 -0. 167b -0.216· 0.270· -0.212b 1.000 
lPG -0.027 -0.096 -0.022 0.092 -0.014 -0.184b 0.171b 0.074 0.094 0.113 0.023 0.Q18 -0.650c -0.269c 0.530c -0.010 0.281c 1.000 
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Table 7: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Weibull Hazard Model 
This table reports results from estimation of the Weibull distribution hazard model. The density 
function for Weibull hazard model is exp (X~)btb-lexp (- exp e~) t b). The log-likelihood 
function is as given in (14), mlog(b) + ~iEJ x~ + (b - 1) ~iEJ logti - ~f=l tibeXP r-~); where 
] is the number of complete observations; m is the number of entities in J; n is the number of 
observations. 
Each duration regression contains 145 observations in the estimation. Among the 145 observations, 
there are 129 observations with complete filing and discharge dates, and 16 observations are still 
under bankruptcy protection. Duration is defined as the number of days between the filing and the 
discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. Trustee is a dummy variable and equals one if 
the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four biggest accountancy and professional services 
firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA variable is a dummy variable equal one (zero) if the firm files 
for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (BIA) regulations. TSX variable is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the filing firm is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. 
Log Age (L(Age)) variable is the logarithm of firm's age before the filing (Age is defined in years). 
Sigma is the standard deviation of the firm's stock returns during the one year period before the 
filing date. Log TA (L(TA)) is the logarithm of total assets (total assets is defined in $ million). 
Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is calculated as the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio oftota1liabilities to total assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the 
ratio of net income (loss) to firm's sales. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (!AOM) is an 
industry variable that captures the different industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the 
differences between firm's operating margin and the contemporaneous industry median operating 
margin. Industry Median Operating Margin (10M) for each bankrupt firm is constructed using all 
other contemporaneous Compustat firms with the same 4-digits SIC Code. Default Spread (DS) is 
defined as the differences between the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term 
government of Canada bond yield at the time before the firm's filing date. Stock returns are 
missing for 8 firms, while Net income by sales are missing for 8 firms. Specification model using 
the standard deviation (5) below uses only 129 finns compared to 137 for models (1) to (4). 
Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1 %, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -4.434*** -4.436*** -4.508*** -4.506*** -4.775*** 
(0.391) (0.395) (0.416) (0.417) (0.480) 
Trustee 0.011 0.009 -0.029 -0.023 -0.030 
(0.206) (0.221) (0.219) (0.228) (0.232) 
CCAA 0.009 -0.028 -0.067 
(0.281) (0.289) (0.304) 
TSX 0.116 0.115 0.102 0.105 0.213 
(0.234) (0.238) (0.235) (0.238) (0.251) 
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L(Age) -0.250** -0.250** -0.245** -0.246** -0.234** 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.101) 
Sigma 0.496 
(1.915) 
L(TA) -0.034 -0.034 -0.026 -0.024 -0.004 
(0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.070) (0.074) 
SDR 0.206 0.216 0.230 
(0.402) (0.415) (0.422) 
Leverage 0.142 0.141 0.149 0.153 0.137 
(0.146) (0.150) (0.148) (0.153) (0.178) 
NM -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
10M -0.072 -0.076 -0.232 -0.226 -0.240 
(1.183) (1.191) (1.218) (1.221) (1.248) 
IAOM 0.288** 0.286* 0.278* 0.282* 0.259* 
(0.145) (0.152) (0.144) (0.151) (0.156) 
DS -0.446*** -0.446*** -0.434*** -0.433*** -0.412*** 
(0.150) (0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.155) 
Scale 0.999 0.999 0.997 0.998 0.982 
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.073) 
Number of Obs. 137 137 137 137 129 
Log Likelihood -204.328 -204.328 -204.198 -204.193 -189.791 
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.152 0.154 0.154 0.147 
62 
Table 8: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Log-logistic Hazard Model 
The table lists the estimation results of the Log-logistic distribution hazard model. The density 
1 
--1 
function for Log-logistic hazard model is ~~. The log-likelihood function for Log-logistic 
O'[l+atu] 
hazard model is as given in (20), I~l dilOg (: t~-: 2) + If=l(l- di ) log (-~-.. ~); where d i 
[l+atu] l+at'" 
is one ifthe observation is fully observed, zero otherwise; a = exp (d\ 
0' 
Each duration regression contains 145 observations in the estimation. Among the 145 observations, 
there are 129 observations with complete filing and discharge dates, and 16 observations are still 
under bankruptcy protection. Duration is defined as the number of days between the filing and the 
discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. Trustee is a dummy variable and equals one if 
the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four biggest accountancy and professional services 
firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA variable is a dummy variable equal one (zero) if the firm files 
for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (BIA) regulations. TSX variable is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the filing firm is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. 
Log Age (L(Age») variable is the logarithm of firm's age before the filing (Age is defined in years). 
Sigma is the standard deviation of the firm's stock returns during the one year period before the 
filing date. Log TA (L(TA» is the logarithm of total assets (total assets is defined in $ million). 
Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is calculated as the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the 
ratio of net income (loss) to firm's sales. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is an 
industry variable that captures the different industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the 
differences between firm's operating margin and the contemporaneous industry median operating 
margin. Industry Median Operating Margin (10M) for each bankrupt firm is constructed using all 
other contemporaneous Compustat firms with the same 4-digits SIC Code. Default Spread CDS) is 
defined as the differences between the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term 
government of Canada bond yield at the time before the firm's filing date. Stock returns are 
missing for 8 firms, while Net income by sales are missing for 8 firms. Specification model using 
the standard deviation (5) below uses only 129 firms compared to 137 for models (1) to (4). 
Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1 %, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -3.559*** -3.383*** -3.656*** -3.486*** -3.761*** 
(0.424) (0.427) (0.447) (0.447) (0 .. 536) 
Trustee -0.145 -0.078 -0.177 -0.112 -0.108 
(0.221) (0.219) (0.227) (0.225) (0.228) 
CCAA -0.557* -0.567* -0.598** 
(0.290) (0.291) (0.295) 
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TSX 0.150 0.143 0.147 0.143 0.261 
(0.260) (0.257) (0.259) (0.257) (0.269) 
L(Age) -0.270** -0.283*** -0.265** -0.279** -0.266** 
(0.111) (0.109) (0.111) (0.109) (0.112) 
Sigma 0.325 
(2.101) 
L(TA) -0.068 -0.024 -0.062 -0.017 0 
, 
(0.069) (0.072) (0.069) (0.073) (0.079) 
SDR 0.288 0.320 0.280 
(0.452) (0.447) (0.458) 
Leverage -0.033 0.030 -0.021 0.044 0.050 
(0.144) (0.147) (0.146) (0.149) (0.158) 
NM -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
10M 1.384 1.830 1.174 1.614 1.528 
(1.277) (1.291) (1.321) (1.329) (1.346) 
IAOM 0.231 * 0.290** 0.227* 0.288** 0.245* 
(0.135) (0.137) (0.135) (0.137) (0.141) 
DS -0.503*** -0.503*** -0.489*** -0.489*** -0.468*** 
(0.136) (0.135) (0.137) (0.135) (0.138) 
Scale 0.673 0.662 0.673 0.662 0.652 
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) 
Number of Obs. 137 137 137 137 129 
Log Likelihood -206.422 -204.629 -206.219 -204.371 -189.873 
Adjusted R2 0.194 0.214 0.196 0.217 0.206 
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Table 9: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Cox's Proportional 
Hazard Model 
This table reports results from estimation of the Cox's proportional hazard model. The 
log-likelihood function for Cox's proportional hazard model is as follow, 
Lf=l d i log [~ exp (XiP~ OP)]. Where d i equals one if the observation is fully observed, zero 
}ER(yiJ exp Xl 
otherWise. 
Each duration regression contains 145 observations in the estimation. Among the 145 
observations, there are 129 observations with complete filing and discharge dates, and 16 
observations are still under bankruptcy protection. Duration is dermed as the number of days 
between the filing and the discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. Trustee is a 
dummy variable and equals one if the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four biggest 
accountancy and professional services firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA variable is a dummy 
variable equal one (zero) if the firm files for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (BIA) 
regulations. TSX variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the filing firm is 
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. Log Age (L(Age» variable is the 
logarithm of firm's age before the filing (Age is defined in years). Sigma is the standard 
deviation of the firm's stock returns during the one year period before the filing date. Log TA 
(L(TA» is the logarithm of total assets (total assets is defined in $ million). Secured Debt Ratio 
(SDR) is calculated as the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Leverage is defined as the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the ratio of net 
income (loss) to firm's sales. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (lAOM) is an industry 
variable that captures the different industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the 
differences between firm's operating margin and the contemporaneous industry median 
operating margin. Industry Median Operating Margin (10M) for each bankrupt firm is 
constructed using all other contemporaneous Compustat firms with the same 4-digits SIC Code. 
Default Spread (DS) is defined as the differences between the long-term corporate bond yield 
and the long-term government of Canada bond yield at the time before the firm's filing date. 
Stock returns are missing for 8 firms, while Net income by sales are missing for 8 firms. 
Specification model using the standard deviation (5) below uses only 129 firms compared to 
137 for models (1) to (4). Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1 %, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Trustee 0.014 0.021 -0.010 0 -0.008 
(0.208) (0.223) (0.221) (0.230) (0.238) 
CCAA -0.027 -0.051 -0.083 
(0.287) (0.294) (0.314) 
TSX 0.109 0.113 0.100 0.106 0.209 
(0.236) (0.240) (0.238) (0.241) (0.258) 
L(Age) -0.246** -0.246** -0.242** -0.243** -0.231 ** 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.104) 
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Sigma 0.588 
(1.975) 
L(TA) -0.034 -0.032 -0.029 -0.025 -0.005 
(0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.070) (0.075) 
SDR 0.129 0.146 0.154 
(0.407) (0.419) (0.432) 
Leverage 0.124 0.127 0.129 0.136 0.112 
(0.151) (0.155) (0.153) (0.157) (0.184) 
NM -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
10M 0.095 0.111 -0.011 0.006 -0.027 
(1.211) (1.224) (1.255) (1.258) (1.305) 
lAOM 0.261* 0.265* 0.256* 0.263* 0.238 
(0.145) (0.151) (0.145) (0.151) (0.158) 
DS -0.471 *** -0.471 *** -0.463*** -0.461*** -0.447*** 
(0.148) (0.148) (0.150) (0.150) (0.156) 
Number of Obs. 137 137 137 137 129 
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.156 0.157 0.157 0.148 
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Table 10: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using WeibuU Hazard Model, 
Effect of Firm Location 
This table reports the estimation results of the Weibull distribution hazard model. The density 
function for Weibull hazard model is exp C1)bt b - 1exp (- exp (X1) tb ). The log-likelihood 
functiQn is as given in (14), mlog(b) + LiE! x1 + (b - 1) LiE! logti - L~l tibexP eX1); where 
] is the number of complete observations; m is the number of entities in J; n is the number of 
observations. 
Each duration regression contains 145 observations in the estimation. Among the 145 observations, 
there are 129 observations with complete filing and discharge dates, and 16 observations are still 
under bankruptcy protection. Duration is defined as the number of days between the filing and the 
discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. Trustee is a dummy variable and equals one if 
the finn's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four biggest accountancy and professional services 
firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA variable is a dummy variable equal one (zero) if the fmn files 
for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (BIA) regulations. TSX variable is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the filing firm is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. 
Log Age (L(Age» variable is the logarithm offmn's age before the filing (Age is defined in years). 
Sigma is the standard deviation of the firm's stock returns during the one year period before the 
filing date. Log TA (L(TA) is the logarithm of total assets (total assets is defmed in $ million). 
Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is calculated as the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the 
ratio of net income (loss) to firm's sales. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is an 
industry variable that captures the different industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the 
differences between firm's operating margin and the contemporaneous industry median operating 
margin. Industry Median Operating Margin (10M) for each bankrupt fmn is constructed using all 
other contemporaneous Compustat firms with the same 4-digits SIC Code. Default Spread (DS) is 
defined as the differences between the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term 
government of Canada bond yield at the time before the firm's filing date. Alberta is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm's headquarter is located in Alberta province and zero otherwise. 
British Columbia is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm's headquarter is located in British 
Columbia province and zero otherwise. Ontario is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm's 
headquarter is located in Ontario province and zero otherwise. Quebec is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm's headquarter is located in Quebec province and zero otherwise. Stock returns 
are missing for 8 firms, while Net income by sales are missing for 8 firms. Specification model 
using the standard deviation (5) below uses only 129 firms compared to 137 for models (1) to (4). 
Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1 %, respectively. 
Variable (1) 
Intercept -3.974*** 
(0.798) 
(2) 
-3.989*** 
(0.817) 
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(3) 
-3.983*** 
(0.798) 
(4) 
-4.003*** 
(0.819) 
(5) 
-4.277*** 
(0.824) 
Trustee 0.093 0.099 0.076 0.083 0.086 
(0.202) (0.214) (0.216) (0.225) (0.227) 
CCAA -0.027 -0.035 -0.119 . 
(0.305) (0.306) (0.317) 
TSX 0.194 0.200 0.186 0.192 0.336 
(0.229) (0.238) (0.233) (0.240) (0.252) 
L(Age) -0.255** -0.256** -0.252** -0.253** -0.233** 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.104) 
Sigma -0.138 
(1.837) 
Alberta -0.118 -0.090 -0.155 -0.122 -0.003 
(0.729) (0.793) (0.748) (0.804) (0.798) 
British Columbia -0.853 -0.833 -0.878 -0.853 -0.840 
(0.730) (0.765) (0.738) (0.770) . (0.761) 
Ontario -0.292 -0.275 -0.315 -0.294 -0.242 
(0.720) (0.745) (0.727) (0.749) (0.747) 
Quebec -0.050 -0.030 -0.085 -0.061 -0.007 
(0.745) (0.779) (0.761) (0.790) (0.783) 
L(TA) -0.070 -0.068 -0.066 -0.063 -0.052 
(0.065) (0.069) (0.068) (0.072) (0.077) 
SDR 0.093 0.099 0.100 
(0.416) (0.420) (0.425) 
Leverage 0.070 0.073 0.073 0.077 0.063 
(0.161) (0.165) (0.162) (0.166) (0.187) 
NM -0.008* -0.008* -0.008* -0.008* -0.008* 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
10M -0.120 -0.113 -0.188 -0.183 -0.124 
(1.151) (1.155) (1.189) (1.192) (1.223) 
IAOM 0.241* 0.244* 0.238* 0.242* 0.234 
(0.137) (0.142) (0.137) (0.142) (0.149) 
DS -0.491 *** -0.491*** -0.484*** -0.483*** -0.446*** 
(0.152) (0.152) (0.155) (0.155) (0.158) 
Scale 0.961 0.962 0.961 0.962 0.942 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) 
Number of Obs. 137 137 137 137 129 
Log Likelihood -200.394 -200.390 -200.369 -200.362 -185.576 
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.201 
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Table 11: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Log-logistic Hazard 
Model, Effect of Firm Location 
The table lists the estimation results of the Log-logistic distribution hazard modeL The density 
.!....1 
function for Log-logistic hazard model is a tu 2. The log-likelihood function for Log-logistic 
q [1+at~] 
I ( ) . 
.!....1 
hazard model is as given in (20), rf=l dtlog : tu 12 + rf=l(1- dd log e~); where dt 
[l+atu] l+atu 
is one if the observation is fully observed, zero otherwise; a = exp eXiP ). q 
Each duration regression contains 145 observations in the estimation. Among the 145 observations, 
there are 129 observations with complete ftling and discharge dates, and 16 observations are still 
under bankruptcy protection. Duration is defined as the number of days between the filing and the 
discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. Trustee is a dummy variable and equals one if 
the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four biggest accountancy and professional services 
firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA variable is a dummy variable equal one (zero) if the firm ftles 
for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (BIA) regulations. TSX variable is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the ftling finn is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. 
Log Age (L(Age)) variable is the logarithm of firm's age before the ftling (Age is defined in years). 
Sigma is the standard deviation of the firm's stock returns during the one year period before the 
filing date. Log TA (L(TA)) is the logarithm of total assets (total assets is defmed in $ million). 
Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is calculated as the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the 
ratio of net income (loss) to firm's sales. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is an 
industry variable that captures the different industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the 
differences between firm's operating margin and the contemporaneous industry median operating 
margin. Industry Median Operating Margin (lOM) for each bankrupt firm is constructed using all 
other contemporaneous Compustat firms with the same 4-digits SIC Code. Default Spread (DS) is 
defined as· the differences between the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term 
government of Canada bond yield at the time before the frrm's filing date. Alberta is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm's headquarter is located in Alberta province and zero otherwise. 
British Columbia is a dummy variable equal to one if the frrm's headquarter is located in British 
Columbia province and zero otherwise. Ontario is a dummy variable equal to one if the frrm's 
headquarter is located in Ontario province and zero otherwise. Quebec is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the frrm's headquarter is located in Quebec province and zero otherwise. Stock returns 
are missing for 8 firms, while Net income by sales are missing for 8 frrms. Specification model 
using the standard deviation (5) below uses only 129 firms compared to 137 for models (1) to (4). 
Standard errors are between parentheses. *, * *, and * * * denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1 %, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
69 
Intercept -3.427*** -3.788*** -3.439*** -3.794*** -4.055*** 
(0.864) (0.852) (0.862) (0.850) (0.868) 
Trustee -0.097 0.007 -0.126 -0.016 -0.001 
(0.224) (0.223) (0.232) (0.231) (0.236) 
CCAA -0.702** -0.698** -0.736** 
(0.314) (0.315) (0.321) 
TSX 0.120 0.181 0.103 0.170 0.321 
(0.270) (0.268) (0.272) (0.270) (0.287) 
L(Age) -0.258** -0.265** -0.255** -0.262** -0.246** 
(0.112) (0.109) (0.112) (0.109) (0.113) 
Sigma -0.025 
(2.187) 
Alberta 0.060 0.718 -0.038 0.641 0.757 
(0.800) (0.828) (0.822) (0.850) (0.857) 
British Columbia -0.602 -0.077 -0.668 -0.130 -0.078 
(0.809) (0.817) (0.818) (0.827) (0.832) 
Ontario -0.121 0.392 -0.169 0.353 0.370 
(0.773) (0.782) (0.778) (0.787) (0.798) 
Quebec -0.052 0.377 -0.125 0.318 0.396 
(0.798) (0.793) (0.810) (0.806) (0.812) 
L(TA) -0.076 -0.026 -0.070 -0.023 -0.016 
(0.069) (0.072) (0.070) (0.073) (0.081) 
SDR 0.236 0.179 0.089 
(0.473) (0.460) (0.471) 
Leverage -0.009 0.076 -0.002 0.081 0.088 
(0.149) (0.153) (0.150) (0.154) (0.164) 
NM -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
10M 0.755 1.142 0.653 1.065 0.865 
(1.328) (1.336) (1.343) (1.350) (1.379) 
IAOM 0.227* 0.305** 0.226* 0.304** 0.265* 
(0.136) (0.139) (0.136) (0.139) (0.145) 
DS -0.509*** -0.501*** -0.494*** -0.491 *** -0.474*** 
(0.141) (0.137) (0.143) (0.139) (0.143) 
Scale 0.665 0.650 0.664 0.650 0.641 
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) 
Number of Obs. 137 137 137 137 129 
Log Likelihood -204.786 -202.367 -204.661 -202.290 -187.579 
Adjusted R2 0.213 0.240 0.214 0.241 0.234 
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Table 12: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Cox's Proportional 
Hazard Model, Effect of Firm Location 
This table lists estimation results of the Cox's proportional hazard model. The log-likelihood 
function for Cox's proportional hazard model is as follow, r~l di log [1: 0 exp (XdJ~ OP)]. Where 
JER(yi) exp x, 
d i equals one if the observation is fully observed, zero otherwise. 
Each tegression contains 145 observations in the estimation. Among the 145 observations, there 
are 129 observations with complete filing and discharge dates, and 16 observations are still under 
bankruptcy protection. Duration is defmed as the number of days between the filing and the 
discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. Trustee is a dummy variable and equals one if 
the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four biggest accountancy and professional services 
firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA variable is a dummy variable equal one (zero) if the firm files 
for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (BIA) regulations. TSX variable is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the filing firm is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. 
Log Age (L(Age» variable is the logarithm of firm's age before the filing (Age is defined in years). 
Sigma is the standard deviation of the firm's stock returns during the one year period before the 
filing date. Log TA (L(TA» is the logarithm of total assets (total assets is defined in $ million). 
Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is calculated as the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Leverage is 
defmed as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the 
ratio of net income (loss) to firm's sales. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (lAOM) is an 
industry variable that captures the different industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the 
differences between firm's operating margin and the contemporaneous industry median operating 
margin. Industry Median Operating Margin (lOM) for each bankrupt firm is constructed using all 
other contemporaneous Compustat firms with the same 4-digits SIC Code. Default Spread (DS) is 
defined as the differences between the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term 
govermnent of Canada bond yield at the time before the firm's filing date. Alberta is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm's headquarter is located in Alberta province and zero otherwise. 
British Columbia is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm's headquarter is located in British 
Columbia province and zero otherwise. Ontario is a dummy variable equal to one if the fum's 
headquarter is located in Ontario province and zero otherwise. Quebec is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm's headquarter is located in Quebec province and zero otherwise. Stock returns 
are missing for 8 fums, while Net income by sales are missing for 8 firms. Specification model 
using the standard deviation (5) below uses only 129 firms compared to 137 for models (1) to (4). 
Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1 %, respectively. 
Variable 
Trustee 
CCAA 
TSX 
(1) 
0.108 
(0.214) 
0.187 
(2) 
0.122 
(0.226) 
-0.063 
(0.325) 
0.199 
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(3) (4) (5) 
0.104 0.117 0.119 
(0.228) (0.237) (0.244) 
-0.066 -0.142 
(0.326) (0.345) 
0.184 0.197 0.344 
(0.241) (0.250) (0.245) (0.252) (0.272) 
L(Age) -0.265** -0.266** -0.264** -0.265** -0.247** 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.108) (0.112) 
Sigma 0.034 
(1.966) 
Alberta -0.118 -0.053 -0.128 -0.064 0.054 
(0.761) (0.830) (0.781) (0.842) (0.855) 
British Columbia -0.860 -0.809 -0.867 -0.816 -0.815 
(0.765) (0.809) (0.776) (0.815) (0.825) 
Ontario -0.315 -0.274 -0.320 -0.280 -0.242 
(0.752) (0.780) (0.760) (0.785) (0.799) 
Quebec -0.042 0.005 -0.051 -0.005 0.041 
(0.778) (0.814) (0.796) (0.827) (0.837) 
L(TA) -0.071 -0.067 -0.070 -0.066· -0.051 
(0.069) (0.072) (0.071) (0.075) (0.082) 
SDR 0.023 0.032 0.029 
(0.438) (0.441) (0.455) 
Leverage 0.072 0.078 0.073 0.080 0.057 
(0.170) (0.173) (0.171) (0.175) (0.199) 
NM -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
10M -0.023 0.000 -0.040 -0.024 -0.019 
(1.225) (1.231) (1.269) (1.273) (1.329) 
IAOM 0.238* 0.245* 0.237* 0.244* 0.235 
(0.143) (0.148) (0.144) (0.148) (0.159) 
DS -0.526*** -0.525*** -0.524*** -0.522*** -0.492*** 
(0.156) (0.155) (0.159) (0.159) (0.165) 
Number of Obs. 137 137 137 137 129 
Adjusted R2 0.199 0.200 0.199 0.200 0.197 
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Table 13: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Weibull Hazard Model, 
Uncensored Data Only 
This table lists results from estimation of the Weibull distribution hazard model. The density 
function for Weibull hazard model is exp r-~)btb-lexp (- exp e~) t b). The log-likelihood 
functipn is as given in (14), mlog(b) + LiE] x~ + (b -1) LiE] logti - Lb:l tibexP t~); where 
] is the number of complete observations; m is the number of entities in J; n is the number of 
observations. 
Each duration regression contains 129 observations in the estimation. Duration is defined as the 
number of days between the filing and the discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. 
Trustee is a dummy variable and equals one if the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four 
biggest accountancy and professional services firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA variable is a 
dummy variable equal one (zero) if the firm files for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (BIA) 
regulations. TSX variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the filing firm is listed 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. Log Age (L(Age)) variable is the logarithm of 
firm's age before the filing (Age is defined in years). Sigma is the standard deviation of the firm's 
stock returns during the one year period before the filing date. Log TA (L(TA») is the logarithm of 
total assets (total assets is defmed in $ million). Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is calculated as the 
ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the ratio of net income (loss) to firm's sales. 
Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (lAOM) is an industry variable that captures the different 
industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the differences between firm's operating margin 
and the contemporaneous industry median operating inargin. Industry Median Operating Margin 
(lOM) for each bankrupt firm is constructed using all other contemporaneous Compustat frrms 
with the same 4-digits SIC Code. Default Spread (DS) is defined as the differences between the 
long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term government of Canada bond yield at the time 
before the firm's filing date. Stock returns are missing for 8 firms, while Net income by sales are 
missing for 8 firms. Specification model using the standard deviation (5) below uses only 115 
firms compared to 123 for models (1) to (4). Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1 %, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -4.886*** -4.898*** -5.070*** -5.069*** -5.355*** 
(0.380) (0.382) (0.396) (0.396) (0.460) 
Trustee -0.010 -0.032 -0.114 -0.110 -0.102 
(0.201) (0.215) (0.210) (0.220) (0.223) 
CCAA 0.075 -0.017 -0.031 
(0.280) (0.286) (0.308) 
TSX 0.143 0.132 0.092 0.094 0.192 
(0.226) (0.229) (0.226) (0.229) (0.240) 
L(Age) -0.246** -0.243** -0.235** -0.235** -0.221 ** 
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(0.097) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) (0.098) 
Sigma 0.887 
(1.925) 
L(TA) -0.047 -0.051 -0.027 -0.026 -0.005 
(0.065) (0.067) (0.066) (0.069) (0.072) 
SDR 0.537 0.543 0.518 
(0.377) (0.390) (0.395) 
I 
Leverage 0.131 0.121 0.149 0.152 0.119 
(0.140) (0.144) (0.141) (0.146) (0.174) 
NM -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
10M 0.251 0.225 -0.133 -0.132 -0.150 
(1.199) (1.201) (1.211) (1.212) (1.239) 
IAOM 0.281 ** 0.269* 0.259* 0.261* 0.233 
(0.137) (0.142) (0.134) (0.139) (0.144) 
DS 0.014 0.010 0.056 0.057 0.055 
(0.155) (0.155) (0.153) (0.154) (0.155) 
Scale 0.977 0.975 0.968 0.968 0.951 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) 
Number of Obs. 123 123 123 123 115 
Log Likelihood -190.065 -190.029 -189.091 -189.089 -174.884 
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.095 0.109 0.109 0.104 
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Table 14: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Log-logistic Hazard 
Model, Uncensored Data Only 
This table reports the results from estimation of the Log-logistic distribution hazard model. The 
2-1 
density function for Log-logistic hazard model is a tu 1 2. The log-likelihood function for 
U[l+atu] 
Log-logistic hazard model IS as . given in (20), 
Lf:l diIOg (: t~-: 2) + Lf=l(l- di) log (~); where di is one if the observation is fully 
[l+atu] l+atu 
observed, zero otherwise; a = exp (xtP). 
U 
Each duration regression contains 129 observations in the estimation. Duration is defined as the 
number of days between the filing and the discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. 
Trustee is a dummy variable and equals one if the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four 
biggest accountancy and professional services firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA variable is a 
dummy variable equal one (zero) if the firm files for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (BIA) 
regulations. TSX variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the filing firm is listed 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. Log Age (L(Age)) variable is the logarithm of 
firm's age before the filing (Age is defined in years). Sigma is the standard deviation of the firm's 
stock returns during the one year period before the filing date. Log TA (L(TA)) is the logarithm of 
total assets (total assets is defined in $ million). Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is calculated as the 
ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the ratio of net income (loss) to firm's sales. 
Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is an industry variable that captures the different 
industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the differences between firm's operating margin 
and the contemporaneous industry median operating margin. Industry Median Operating Margin 
(10M) for each bankrupt firm is constructed using all other contemporaneous Compustat firms 
with the same 4-digits SIC Code. Default Spread (DS) is defined as the differences between the 
long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term government of Canada bond yield at the time 
before the firm's filing date. Stock returns are missing for 8 firms, while Net income by sales are 
missing for 8 firms. Specification model using the standard deviation (5) below uses only 115 
firms compared to 123 for models (1) to (4). Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1 %, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -3.846*** -3.663*** -3.996*** -3.820*** -4.179*** 
(0.423) (0.423) (0.443) (0.440) (0.533) 
Trustee -0.182 -0.113 -0.237 -0.172 -0.166 
(0.221) (0.217) (0.228) (0.224) (0.227) 
CCAA -0.609** -0.639** -0.646** 
(0.289) (0.291) (0.295) 
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TSX 0.115 0.090 0.105 0.083 0.175 
(0.257) (0.252) (0.257) (0.252) (0.261) 
L(Age) -0.301 *** -0.313*** ~0.290** -0.305*** -0.295*** 
(0.113) (0.110) (0.113) (0.110) (0.113) 
Sigma 1.195 
(2.160) 
L(TA) -0.069 -0.019 -0.061 -0.008 0.021 
(0.068) (0.072) (0.068) (0.072) (0.078) 
SDR 0.461 0.528 0.431 
(0.449) (0.444) (0.457) 
Leverage -0.024 0.048 -0.005 0.073 0.061 
(0.l40) (0.l43) (0.142) (0.145) (0.154) 
NM -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
10M 1.542 2.004 1.183 1.628 1.622 
(1.271) (1.268) (1.322) (1.312) (1.322) 
IAOM 0.235* 0.303** 0.232* 0.304** 0.251 * 
(0.134) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135) (0.139) 
DS -0.122 -0.110 -0.099 -0.082 -0.080 
(0.161) (0.158) (0.162) (0.160) (0.159) 
Scale 0.650 0.637 0.649 0.636 0.625 
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) 
Number of Obs. 123 123 123 123 115 
Log Likelihood -193.858 -191.716 -193.323 -190.995 -176.655 
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.156 0.134 0.166 0.152 
76 
Table 15: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Cox's Proportional 
Hazard Model, Uncensored Data Only 
This table reports results from estimation of the Cox's proportional hazard model. The 
log-likelihood function for Cox's proportional hazard model is as follow, 
Ltl di log [E 0 exp (XiP~ OP)]. Where di equals one if the observation is fully observed, zero 
JER(yi) exp x, 
otherWise. 
Each duration regression contains 129 observations in the estimation. Duration is defined as the 
number of days between the filing and the discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. 
Trustee is a dummy variable and equals one if the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four 
biggest accountancy and professional services firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA variable is a 
dummy variable equal one (zero) if the firm files for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (RIA) 
regulations. TSX variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the filing firm is listed 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. Log Age (L(Age» variable is the logarithm of 
firm's age before the filing (Age is defined in years). Sigma is the standard deviation of the firm's 
stock returns during the one year period before the filing date. Log TA (L(TA») is the logarithm of 
total assets (total assets is defmed in $ million). Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is calculated as the 
ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the ratio of net income (loss) to firm's sales. 
Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is an industry variable that captures the different 
industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the differences between firm's operating margin 
and the contemporaneous industry median operating margin. Industry Median Operating Margin 
(10M) for each bankrupt firm is constructed using all other contemporaneous Compustat firms 
with the same 4-digits SIC Code. Default Spread CDS) is defined as the differences between the 
long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term government of Canada bond yield at the time 
before the firm's filing date. Stock returns are missing for 8 firms, while Net income by sales are 
missing for 8 firms. Specification model using the standard deviation (5) below uses only 115 
firms compared to 123 for models (1) to (4). Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and 
* * * denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1 %, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Trustee -0.007 -0.017 -0.092 -0.082 -0.078 
(0.208) (0.223) (0.219) (0.229) (0.236) 
CCAA 0.035 -0.043 -0.049 
(0.294) (0.300) (0.329) 
TSX 0.135 0.130 0.089 0.094 0.190 
(0.233) (0.238) (0.237) (0.240) (0.256) 
L(Age) -0.254** -0.254** -0.246** -0.246** -0.234** 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.104) 
Sigma 0.968 
(2.055) 
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L(TA) -0.045 -0.047 -0.029 -0.026 -0.004 
(0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.072) (0.075) 
SDR 0.464 0.477 0.451 
(0.397) (0.407) (0.419) 
Leverage 0.117 0.113 0.l36 0.141 0.102 
(0.149) (0.152) (0.151) (0.156) (0.186) 
NM -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
10M 0.397 0.382 0.043 0.049 0.010 
(1.255) (1.262) (1.286) (1.287) (1.338) 
IAOM 0.260* 0.256* 0.246* 0.251 * 0.221 
(0.140) (0.146) (0.139) (0.l44) (0.152) 
DS -0.016 -0.017 0.024 0.026 0.026 
(0.160) (0.160) (0.161) (0.162) (0.165) 
Number of Obs. 123 123 123 123 115 
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.090 0.l00 0.100 0.094 
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Table 16: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Weibull Hazard Model, 
Effect of Outliers 
The table lists results from estimation of the Weibull distribution hazard model. The density 
function for Weibull hazard model is exp r-~)btb-lexp (- exp e~) t b ). The log-likelihood 
] is the number of complete observations; m is the number of entities in J; n is the number of 
observations. 
Each duration regression contains 145 observations in the estimation. Among the 145 observations, 
there are 129 observations with complete filing and discharge dates, and 16 observations are still 
under bankruptcy protection. Duration is defmed as the number of days between the filing and the 
discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. Trustee is a dummy variable and equals one if 
the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four biggest accountancy and professional services 
firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA variable is a dummy variable equal one (zero) if the firm files 
for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (BIA) regulations. TSX variable is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the filing firm is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. 
Log Age (L(Age» variable is the logarithm of firm's age before the filing (Age is defined in years). 
Sigma is the standard deviation of the frrm's stock returns during the one year period before the 
filing date. Log TA (L(TA» is the logarithm of total assets (total assets is defined in $ million). 
Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is calculated as the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the 
ratio of net income (loss) to firm's sales. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is an 
industry variable that captures the different industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the 
differences between firm's operating margin and the contemporaneous industry median operating 
margin. Industry Median Operating Margin (lOM) for each bankrupt firm is constructed using all 
other contemporaneous Compustat firms with the same 4-digits SIC Code. Default Spread (DS) is 
defined as the differences between the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term 
government of Canada bond yield at the time before the firm's filing date. Stock returns are 
missing for 8 firms, while Net income by sales are missing for 8 firms. Specification model using 
the standard deviation (5) below uses only 129 firms compared to 137 for models (1) to (4). 
Standard errors are between parentheses. *, * *, and * * * denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1 %, respectively. Winsorizing is performed by setting the ratio that below the 1 st and above 
the 99th percentile to the values of the 1 st and 99th percentiles. Winsorizing is conducted on the all 
the explanatory variables except for Trustee, CCAA and TSX dummy variables. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -4.394*** -4.393*** -4.460*** -4.455*** -4.765*** 
(0.401) (0.408) (0.425) (0.427) (0.492) 
Trustee 0.027 0.028 -0.008 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.209) (0.223) (0.221) (0.231) (0.235) 
CCAA -0.003 -0.033 -0.053 
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(0.288) (0.294) (0.311) 
TSX 0.108 0.108 0.095 0.100 0.213 
(0.235) (0.240) (0.236) (0.240) (0.255) 
L(Age) -0.242** -0.242** -0.238** -0.239** -0.223** 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.102) 
Sigma 0.763 
(1.938) 
L(TA) -0.039 -0.039 -0.031 -0.029 -0.008 
(0.068) (0.070) (0.071) (0.073) (0.077) 
SDR 0.193 0.203 0.202 
(0.411) (0.422) (0.429) 
Leverage 0.088 0.088 0.091 0.096 0.055 
(0.160) (0.165) (0.160) (0.166) (0.189) 
NM -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
10M -0.043 -0.041 -0.199 -0.190 -0.207 
(1.204) (1.213) (1.244) (1.247) (1.278) 
IAOM 0.341 * 0.342 0.325* 0.333 0.295 
(0.195) (0.208) (0.197) (0.208) (0.223) 
DS -0.425*** -0.425*** -0.414*** -0.413*** -0.394*** 
(0.147) (0.147) (0.148) (0.148) (0.151) 
Scale 1.007 1.007 1.005 1.006 0.990 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) 
Number of Obs. 137 137 137 137 129 
Log Likelihood -205.641 -205.641 -205.532 -205.526 -191.110 
Adjusted R2 0.136 0.136 0.137 0.137 0.129 
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Table 17: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Log-logistic Hazard 
Model, Effect of Outliers 
This table lists results from estimation of the Log-logistic hazard model. The density function for 
.!-1 
Log-logistic hazard model is ~ to" 1 2 • The log-likelihood function for Log-logistic hazard model 
U[l+atn] 
is one if the 
observation is fully observed, zero otherwise; a = exp eXIP ). 
U 
Each duration regression contains 145 observations in the estimation. Among the 145 observations, 
there are 129 observations with complete filing and discharge dates, and 16 observations are still 
under bankruptcy protection. Duration is defined as the number of days between the filing and the 
discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. Trustee is a dummy variable and equals one if 
the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four biggest accountancy and professional services 
firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA variable is a dummy variable equal one (zero) if the firm files 
for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (BIA) regulations. TSX variable is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the filing firm is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. 
Log Age (L(Age» variable is the logarithm of firm's age before the filing (Age is defined in years). 
Sigma is the standard deviation of the firm's stock returns during the one year period before the 
filing date. Log TA (L(TA» is the logarithm of total assets (total assets is defined in $ million). 
Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is calculated as the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the 
ratio of net income (loss) to firm's sales. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is an 
industry variable that captures the different industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the 
differences between firm's operating margin and the contemporaneous industry median operating 
margin. Industry Median Operating Margin (10M) for each bankrupt firm is constructed using all 
other contemporaneous Compustat firms with the same 4-digits SIC Code. Default Spread (DS) is 
defmed as the differences between the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term 
government of Canada bond yield at the time before the firm's filing date. Stock returns are 
missing for 8 firms, while Net income by sales are missing for 8 firms. Specification model using 
the standard deviation (5) below uses only 129 frrms compared to 137 for models (1) to (4). 
Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1 %, respectively. Winsorizing is performed by setting the ratio that below the 1 st and above 
the 99th percentile to the values of the 1 st and 99th percentiles. Winsorizing is conducted on the all 
the explanatory variables except for Trustee, CCAA and TSX dummy variables. 
Variable 
Intercept 
Trustee 
(1) 
-3.574*** 
(0.437) 
-0.122 
(2) 
-3.417*** 
(0.441) 
-0.056 
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(3) 
-3.665*** 
(0.458) 
-0.153 
(4) 
-3.510*** 
(0.459) 
-0.089 
(5) 
-3.845*** 
(0.545) 
-0.081 
(0.222) (0.221) (0.228) (0.227) (0.230) 
CCAA -0.508* -0.514* -0.525* 
(0.292) (0.293) (0.297) • 
TSX 0.135 0.125 0.133 0.126 0.243 
(0.259) (0.257) (0.258) (0.256) (0.270) 
L(Age) -0.271 ** -0.279** -0.266** -0.276** -0.261 ** 
(0.113) (0.111) (0.113) (0.111) (0.114) 
I 
Sigma 0.585 
(2.123) 
L(TA) -0.060 -0.020 -0.054 -0.014 0.008 
(0.071) (0.074) (0.071) (0.075) (0.080) 
SDR 0.284 0.303 0.238 
(0.454) (0.450) (0.461) 
Leverage -0.108 -0.053 -0.098 -0.041 -0.046 
(0.160) (0.165) (0.162) (0.166) (0.177) 
NM -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
10M 1.387 1.806 1.178 1.596 1.520 
(1.279) (1.298) (1.324) (1.338) (1.352) 
!AOM 0.193 0.256 0.189 0.253 0.176 
(0.170) (0.174) (0.170) (0.174) (0.172) 
DS -0.472*** -0.473*** -0.457*** -0.458*** -0.441 *** 
(0.134) (0.133) (0.135) (0.134) (0.136) 
Scale 0.681 0.672 0.680 0.671 0.661 
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) 
Number of Obs. 137 137 137 137 129 
Log Likelihood -207.866 -206.386 -207.671 -206.159 -191.641 
Adjusted R2 0.176 0.194 0.179 0.197 0.184 
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Table 18: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Cox's Proportional 
Hazard Model, Effect of Outliers 
This table reports results from estimation of the Cox's proportional hazard model. The 
log-likelihood function for Cox's proportional hazard model is as follow, 
rf=l di log [E. exp (XiP~ ill)]. Where di equals one if the observation is fully observed, zero 
JER(yiJ exp x 
otherWise. 
Each duration regression contains 145 observations in the estimation. Among the 145 observations, 
there are 129 observations with complete filing and discharge dates, and 16 observations are still 
under bankruptcy protection. Duration is defined as the number of days between the filing and the 
discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. Trustee is a dummy variable and equals one if 
the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four biggest accountancy and professional services 
firms, and zero otherwise. CCAA variable is a dummy variable equal one (zero) if the firm files 
for bankruptcy protection under CCAA (BIA) regulations. TSX variable is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the filing firm is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. 
Log Age (L(Age» variable is the logarithm of firm's age before the filing (Age is defined in years). 
Sigma is the standard deviation of the firm's stock returns during the one year period before the 
filing date. Log TA (L(TA» is the logarithm of total assets (total assets is defined in $ million). 
Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) is calculated as the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the 
ratio of net income (loss) to firm's sales. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is an 
industry variable that captures the different industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the 
differences between firm's operating margin and the contemporaneous industry median operating 
margin. Industry Median Operating Margin (10M) for each bankrupt ftrm is constructed using all 
other contemporaneous Compustat firms with the same 4-digits SIC Code. Default Spread (DS) is 
defined as the differences between the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term 
government of Canada bond yield at the time before the firm's filing date. Stock returns are 
missing for 8 ftrms, while Net income by sales are missing for 8 ftrmS. Specification model using 
the standard deviation (5) below uses only 129 firms compared to 137 for models (1) to (4). 
Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1 %, respectively. Winsorizing is performed by setting the ratio that below the 1 st and above 
the 99th percentile to the values of the 1 st and 99th percentiles. Winsorizing is conducted on the all 
the explanatory variables except for Trustee, CCAA and TSX dummy variables. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Trustee 0.032 0.039 0.009 0.020 0.017 
(0.209) (0.224) (0.221) (0.230) (0.239) 
CCAA -0.029 -0.050 -0.057 
(0.291) (0.297) (0.318) 
TSX 0.095 0.100 0.086 0.094 0.198 
(0.234) (0.239) (0.236) (0.240) (0.260) 
L(Age) -0.237** -0.238** -0.235** -0.236** -0.220** 
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(0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.104) 
Sigma 0.917 
(1.973) 
L(TA) -0.035 -0.034 -0.030 -0.027 -0.005 
(0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.072) (0.077) 
SDR 0.130 0.145 0.138 
(0.413) (0.421) (0.435) 
: 
Leverage 0.058 0.061 0.061 0.067 0.016 
(0.163) (0.167) (0.163) (0.168) (0.191) 
NM -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
10M 0.104 0.122 -0.005 0.013 -0.038 
(1.220) (1.233) (1.266) (1.271) (1.318) 
IAOM 0.288 0.295 0.279 0.289 0.244 
(0.197) (0.208) (0.198) (0.208) (0.224) 
DS -0.446*** -0.445*** -0.438*** -0.436*** -0.425*** 
(0.144) (0.144) (0.146) (0.146) (0.151) 
Number of Obs. 137 137 137 137 129 
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.139 0.129 
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Table 19: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Weibull Hazard Model, 
Effect of Other Market Variables 
This table reports results from estimation of the Weibull distribution hazard model. The density 
function for Weibull hazard model is exp (X~)btb-lexp (- exp (X~) t b). The log-likelihood 
functio,n is as given in (14), mlog(b) + LiE] x~ + (b - 1) LiE] logti - Lf=l tib exp (-~); where 
] is the number of complete observations; m is the number of entities in J; n is the number of 
observations. 
Each duration regression contains 145 observations in the estimation. Among the 145 observations, 
there are 129 observations with complete filing and discharge dates, and 16 observations are still 
under bankruptcy protection. Duration is defined as the number of days between the filing and the 
discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. Trustee is a dummy variable and equals one if 
the firm's trustee/monitor belongs to one of the four biggest accountancy and professional services 
firms, and zero otherwise. Log Age (L(Age» variable is the logarithm of firm's age before the 
filing (Age is defined in years). Leverage is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the ratio of net income (loss) to firm's sales. Industry 
Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is an industry variable that captures the different industry 
effect on the duration time. It is based on the differences between firm's operating margin and the 
contemporaneous industry median operating margin. Default Spread (DS) is defined as the 
differences between the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term govermnent of Canada 
bond yield at the time before the firm's filing date. Industrial Production Growth Rate (IPG) is 
calculated between two successive quarters industrial data before the firm's filing date. Interest 
Rate (IR) is measured by 3 month Canadian Treasury Bill rate at the time before the firm's filing 
date. Net income by sales are missing for 8 firms. Specification models (1) to (5) use 137 firms. 
Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1 %, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -4.475*** -4.943*** -5.831 *** -4.540*** -4.989*** 
(0.337) (0.276) (0.338) (0.337) (0.557) 
L(Age) -0.247*** -0.257*** -0.206** -0.265*** -0.234** 
(0.093) (0.095) (0.092) (0.093) (0.097) 
Leverage 0.131 0.045 0.163 0.079 0.093 
(0.146) (0.157) (0.147) (0.154) (0.156) 
NM -0.007* -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
IAOM 0.247** 0.186 0.245** 0.218* 0.205* 
(0.118) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121) (0.122) 
DS -0.471 *** -0.320** -0.239 
(0.147) (0.163) (0.189) 
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IPG 0.199*** 0.125* 0.119 
(0.058) (0.070) (0.072) 
IR 0.169*** 0.060 
(0.061) (0.080) 
Scale 1.001 0.990 0.997 0.994 0.982 
(0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) 
Number of Obs. 137 137 137 137 137 
Log Likelihood -204.517 -205.200 -207.739 -202.955 -188.870 
Adjusted R2 0.150 0.141 0.109 0.169 0.324 
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Table 20: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Log-logistic Hazard 
Model, Effect of Other Market Variables 
This table lists results from estimation of the Log-logistic hazard model. The density function for 
1-1 
Log-logistic hazard model is a ta 1 2. The log-likelihood function for Log-logistic hazard model 
U[t+atu] . 
observation is fully observed, zero otherwise; a = exp eX;p). 
U 
Each duration regression contains 145 observations in the estimation. Among the 145 observations, 
there are 129 observations with complete filing and discharge dates, and 16 observations are still 
under bankruptcy protection. Duration is defined as the number of days between the filing and the 
discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. Log Age (L(Age» variable is the logarithm of 
firm's age before the filing (Age is defined in years). Leverage is defined as the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the ratio of net income (loss) to 
firm's sales. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is an industry variable that captures the 
different industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the differences between firm's 
operating margin and the contemporaneous industry median operating margin. Default Spread (DS) 
is defmed as the differences between the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term 
government of Canada bond yield at the time before the firm's filing date. Industrial Production 
Growth Rate (IPG) is calculated between two successive quarters industrial data before the firm's 
filing date. Interest Rate (IR) is measured by 3 month Canadian Treasury Bill rate at the time 
before the firm's filing date. Net income by sales are missing for 8 firms. Specification models (1) 
to (5) use 137 firms. Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -3.639*** -4.292*** -5.278*** -3.810*** -4.503*** 
(0.369) (0.304) (0.362) (0.380) (0.570) 
L(Age) -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.303*** -0.306*** -0.284*** 
(0.106) (0.105) (0.104) (0.105) (0.108) 
Leverage -0.050 -0.029 -0.007 -0.050 -0.034 
(0.146) (0.145) (0.146) (0.145) (0.145) 
NM -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
IAOM 0.153 0.163 0.137 0.156 0.115 
(0.118) (0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) 
DS -0.541 *** -0.367** -0.246 
(0.135) (0.171) (0.191) 
87 
IPG 0.256*** 0.135 0.104 
(0.068) (0.086) (0.086) 
IR 0.246*** 0.114 
(0.066) (0.086) 
Scale 0.681 0.678 0.677 0.674 0.660 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) 
Number of Obs. 137 137 137 137 137 
Log Likelihood -207.779 -208.899 -210.136 -206.505 -191.572 
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.164 0.149 0.193 0.351 
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Table 21: Determinants of Bankruptcy Duration Using Cox's Proportional 
Hazard Model, Effect of Other Market Variables 
This table reports results from estimation of the Cox's proportional hazard model. The 
log-likelihood function for Cox's proportional hazard model is as follow, 
r~l di log [L exp (XtP~ P)]. Where di equals one if the observation is fully observed, zero 
JERry;) exp Xt 
otherWise. 
Each duration regression contains 145 observations in the estimation. Among the 145 observations, 
there are 129 observations with complete filing and discharge dates, and 16 observations are still 
under bankruptcy protection. Duration is defined as the number of days between the filing and the 
discharge of the firm from bankruptcy protection. Log Age (L(Age» variable is the logarithm of 
firm's age before the filing (Age is defmed in years). Leverage is defmed as the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. Net income by sales (NM) is measured by the ratio of net income (loss) to 
firm's sales. Industry Adjusted Operating Margin (IAOM) is an industry variable that captures the 
different industry effect on the duration time. It is based on the differences between firm's 
operating margin and the contemporaneous industry median operating margin. Default Spread (DS) 
is defined as the differences between the long-term corporate bond yield and the long-term 
government of Canada bond yield at the time before the firm's filing date. Industrial Production 
Growth Rate (IPG) is calculated between two successive quarters industrial data before the firm's 
filing date. Interest Rate (IR) is measured by 3 month Canadian Treasury Bill rate at the time 
before the firm's filing date. Net income by sales are missing for 8 firms. Specification models (1) 
to (5) use 137 firms. Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1 %, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L(Age) -0.245*** -0.260*** -0.204** -0.266*** -0.234** 
(0.094) (0.098) (0.093) (0.096) (0.100) 
Leverage 0.112 0.040 0.149 0.064 0.077 
(0.151) (0.163) (0.154) (0.159) (0.163) 
NM -0.007* -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
IAOM 0.221* 0.178 0.228* 0.198 0.182 
(0.122) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.128) 
DS -0.495*** -0.331 ** -0.226 
(0.144) (0.165) (0.193) 
IPG 0.212*** 0.135* 0.133* 
(0.058) (0.071) (0.075) 
IR 0.188*** 0.084 
(0.061) (0.082) 
Number of Obs. 137 137 137 137 137 
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.148 0.117 0.175 0.158 
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